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In less than a century, the mass media, in its various forms, has
become one of the most powerful and vital forces in relations between
nations. It is difficult to say whether the strength of this new electronic
media leads toward international accord or discord. However, it is dear the
creation and utilization of the mass media has brought about profound
long term changes and will continue to do so. What happens in distant
lands and the way it is interpreted for us, has become inextricably
enmeshed with what happens at home. Nations have embraced the mass
media and the mass media have taken hold of nations, restructuring our
economic, political and cultural interchanges for all time.
The potential power of the media in the twentieth century has been
dealt with in countless books and essays. One aspect of this power,
however, the role of the media in relations between nations - in
particular, two rather antagonistic nations - has been neglected. But this
neglect should by no means undermine the importance of the topic. The
mass media of our age, specifically radio, television and the press, have
taken on the role of the diplomat, shaping, shifting and shearing relations,
simultaneously playing messenger, mediator and miscommunicator
Official diplomacy and the media now function side by side. At times, it's
difficult to say which is actually the more powerful.
In order to demonstrate the expanding role of the media in relations
between nations and their peoples, I have chosen two countries, the Federal
Republic of Germany and the State of Israel.
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The two were not chosen randomly. These countries are unique in
that they are both relatively "new" nations. While people of both
countries may consider themselves descendents of previous, even
ancient nations, they both formed into their present systems only in
the last four decades. Neither nation, nor the relations between the
two nations predate the age of electronic mass media. In their
present administrative units, they are both children of the electronic
era - neither existed without the effects and force of the news media.
The press, radio and then television played a large part in the
development of both nations and the relationship between the two.
While much has been written about German /Israeli relations, not
one book has focused on the specific role of the media within the
political, economic and cultural links of these two young nations.
Yet, in both countries, the broadcast media, specifically television,
have become the major national news medium and mouthpiece.
The subject thus seemed to deserve attention.
The period covered in this case study spans the early 1950s to
the early 1980s. However, no chronology is attempted. Not every
event, visit, transaction or communication between these two
countries is mentioned. Only those specific moments that strongly
exemplify the nature of relations and the impact of the media, such
as the post-war Reparations Agreement, the Eichmann trial and the
massacre at the Munich Olympics, were chosen. Most of the
information comes from conversations with politicians, officials of
press and broadcasting institutions, journalists, academics and some
of Israel's and Germany's main anchorpersons. My depictions of
historical events are based on descriptions and analyses written in
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periodicals at the time. Facts and figures were verified against other
newspaper accounts and information gathered through interviews.
This study was derived from six sources: The research began
with direct observation of German and Israeli news operations at
various times over the course of three years (1982-1985). Interviews
were conducted with news editors, news producers, news executives,
political figures, political advisors and professors. The interviews
were structured in that they were all asked questions about their
views on news, politics and the organizations for which they
worked. Informal and off-the-record discussions were held with
individuals in peripheral organizations. I explored archives of
Israeli and German publications; and finally, I analyzed the logs,
scripts and tapes of news broadcasts. While this is also an historical
analysis, most of the actual research was done in 1985, and the facts
and figures often reflect the conditions of the media and the political
situation of that time, unless otherwise noted.
The last part of my research (and perhaps the most important)
was carried out only recently at a mid-sized daily paper in the
Midwest. In order to gain an insiders look at the media, I took a job
as a staff reporter, covering everything from business to sports and
ending with a stint as a foreign correspondent, writing a special
section on Christmas in the war zones of Nicaragua. More than
anything else, my year as a print reporter taught me just how much
control and power the journalist has to shape a story. The reports I
wrote were not mirrors of an event, but rather an event as seen
through my eyes. Due to timing and structural constraints, a perfect
reflection of reality is impossible. As Robert Manoff and Michael
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Schudson put it in Reading the News, "Reporting is inevitably a part
of a double reality, both separate from the world it tells stories about
and a constituent of that world, an element of the story ." 1 So too for
this research, which is not a perfect reflection or an official doctrine
of the media s role in relations between Germany and Israel, but
rather an analysis of the role of the media in relations between these
two nations as seen through my eyes.
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CHAPTER II
THE MEDIA'S ROLE IN INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS : UNIFIER OR
DIVIDER?
Picture the Persian Gulf, the invasion of Lebanon, war-torn Beirut or
perhaps the chancellor of Germany. Most of our personal images of
peoples and events outside of our own spheres of activity have been
formed by the media. In the twentieth century, aided by video cameras,
satellites and zoom lenses, our knowledge or lack of knowledge about
foreign countries generally depends not on observation and experience but
rather on the news media which "sets the agenda" for public discussion. It
is not our eyes and ears that connect nations; it is the media's eyes and ears.
And the quality of the media's sight and sound play a paramount role
within nations and international relations, both as a means of
communication between peoples and as an instrument of knowledge and
potential understanding between nations.
Images of the world and decisions and judgements about political
events are based less and less on direct experience and increasingly on
media-generated or "mediated" experience. Perceptions of faraway peoples
and places are formed and reinforced by the mass media more than
anything else. As Gaye Tuchman asserts in her book Making News,
"Those topics given the most coverage by the news media are most likely
to be the topics audiences identify as the most pressing issues of the day."l
It is quite popular nowadays to mention that people get most of their
information or "news" from the mass media, especially television, which
the average Westerner is said to watch some seven
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hours per day. Clearly the broadcast media dominate the lives of
human beings more than any previous medium of communication.
This is bound to connect tremendous power to the modern
communication media. And, as Herbert Altschull, who has written
extensively on the role of the media in human affairs, points out, the
tremendous power of the media explains why "those who wield
power seek to control or to regulate the broadcasting media in their
territory, and that those who seek to wrest power strike first of all at
the radio and television outlets .”3
A main difference between the communication systems of
today and those of ancient days is the immediacy factor. The live
telecasts and instant polling in today's media have increased the
velocity of political events to a degree once unimaginable. Within
milliseconds, whatever happens in Washington can be telecast in
Bethesda, Bonn and Beijing. We have transformed the speed of
communication from the speed of transportation to the speed of
light. No longer are political events, political units, political
perceptions limited by the constraints of transportation. What
happens now is reacted to now and even our reactions are responded
to now. We have transformed the order and relations between
nations from the written document and the discourse of the
diplomat into an electric communications network enveloping all.
Leaders of nations are just as likely to announce policy to a journalist
on the airwaves as they are to the diplomat, perhaps even more so.
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"Diplomedia"
There are many varying definitions of diplomacy. In his book
The Anarchical Society
, Hedley Bull defined it as "the gathering and
assessment of information about the international environment" or
the transmit of messages between one individual political
community and another."* In contrast, Ernest Satow defines
diplomacy in A Guide to Diplomatic Practice as "the application of
intelligence and tact to the conduct of official relations between the
governments of independent states."* Under either definition, the
media are very much a part of and play an important role in
international diplomacy. In order to transmit messages, the media
are constantly gathering and assessing information that will greatly
influence the public agenda in much the same way as diplomacy.
Relaying messages from nation to nation, the media create images,
sets scenes, simultaneously paving and plaguing the path of
international relations. As Bull concludes, "Without com-
munication there would be no international society nor any
international system at all ."6
Like the diplomat, the media have become mediators in
international conflict, sending messages to and from places that
traditional diplomats dare not. The danger in the media's
participation in international conflict is the tendency to
sensationalize a story, create images and amplify conflict rather than
harmony. In addition, the media are used as instruments of
persuasion. Even at times when the government will not lend an
ear to the leader of an enemy country, the media might. Thus
Khaddafi may speak directly to the people of the United States
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through the media, though unable to communicate through
traditional diplomatic channels. By the same token, certain actors in
the international arena are granted an audience within traditional
diplomatic circles far more often and in a more balanced way than
they are by the media.
Admittedly, a great deal of the vital information that affects
international relations is not transmitted through a nation's public
news media. Rather it is communicated through ambassadors and
envoys in special codes or perhaps on the "red phone." Still, the
diplomats, transnationals and governments themselves remain very
interested in, concerned about, and even influenced by that which is
printed and broadcast directly to the public. Most governments are
in fact informed and directly influenced by the mass media and often
take action as a result of the news media reports. As Altschull
affirms, "The leaders of government pay heed to the news media.
Hence, management of the content of the news media is a matter of
vital interest both to transnationals and to the national
governments." 7
Many credit television for arranging and pressuring the
meetings of heads of state, such as the meeting of Menachem Begin
and Anwar Sadat in 1977. Still others, such as Ferdinand Marcos,
blame the media for the ousting of once powerful political leaders.
In some situations when traditional forms of formal diplomacy are
no longer functioning, television and the other mass media and
their personnel actually take on the role of the diplomat and simply
bypass the normal channels of international diplomacy. As much of
the work originally delegated to the diplomat is placed in the hands
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of the media, the media serve as the powerful transmitter of
messages between nations, becoming the maker or breaker, keeper or
releaser of valuable, survival-facilitating messages. For example,
during the "Iran hostage crisis," as it came to be known, when
diplomatic communication had come to a standstill. Ayatollah
Khomeini communicated not with President Carter or an
ambassador, but with a crew from CBS' 60 Minutes. When
diplomatic channels were broken, the channels of the media were
capable of maintaining contacts. The media become the great unifier
or divider.
War and peace between nations are now narrated by television
- though admittedly war gets more air time than peace. The media
are determining the significance or insignificance of political events.
As Robert Stein writes in Media Power, "By shaping our picture of
the world on an almost minute to minute basis, the media now
largely determine what we think, how we feel and what we do about
our social and political environment."8
The main difference between the traditional and the electronic
diplomats is that they are reporting to different audiences. Unlike
much of the behind-closed-doors work of traditional diplomacy, the
output of the media is in the open. But like traditional diplomacy,
the media are full of hidden agendas aimed at boosting ratings,
advertising revenue, credibility and power. The audience is usually
kept unaware of these motives. As Altschull says, "The output of
the media is in the public, but its director may be in the shadows."9
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Cross-National Communication versus Non-Communication
Several studies have concluded that simply increasing the
technology and flow of communication into a social system or a
nation does not necessarily result in equivalent information gains
among all groups within a system or a higher level or quality of
"true" cross-cultural communication. After all, these new
technologies are no more than extensions of our own human
message-processing abilities and liabilities. They are programmed to
display, transport, store, duplicate, focus on, magnify or amplify the
data we create. The nature of the messages and the uses to which
they are put depend on us and not our technologies.
In this century, we have increased the technology and flow of
communication to global proportions but the result has not
necessarily been an increased level of constructive communication.
The fact that two countries, like Germany and Israel, pass messages at
a more powerful level of electromagnetic frequency more often than
ever before has not necessarily translated into better relations. The
fact that relations between these nations were never without the
links of modern media and communication devices has not
automatically translated into blissful relations. For in each country,
attitudes and perceptions about things were formed long before
anyone turned on the evening news or read the paper. And the
media cater to these preconceived attitudes and perceptions. A
nation's language, history and memory banks will shape the news
broadcast.
For journalists and their audiences will respond to events not
only in terms of what happens but in terms of what they think is
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happening. People respond according to their perceptions of each
situation, and hence they respond in part to the memories and
images which they already have been carrying in their mind. On this
subject, Karl Deutsch points out:
Each perception is the child of a message and a
memory. With our eyes we may see a red blob,
while our memory may help us recall earlier
experiences with a red necktie, and so we now may
perceive this blob as a necktie of similar shape and
color.. .If we had never seen a necktie before, we
might not recognize the first one we saw...We may
recombine some of our memories into new images,
and later we may perceive something in the outside
world that seems to correspond to what we have
imagined. 10
Rather than a report of reality, the newsmaker, in trying to
interest viewers or readers, has consciously tried to fit a news story
into a mold that matches preconceived notions of reality and
preconceived perceptions. The audience tends to accept the message
with little criticism and combines these messages with their own
individual concepts of the world. The result is a strictly individual
understanding of an event, conflict or crisis that is not necessarily
connected to the actual event. A message was chosen, edited by the
newsmakers, filtered by the audiences' reception apparatus, and the
original message is lost along the way.
Since the end of World War n, just around the time that both
Israel and Germany were establishing themselves and their media
systems, a growing interest developed in the effects a more powerful
mass media have on the community and the individuals they exist
to serve. In 1949, Joseph Klapper, in The Effects of Mass
11
Communication, concluded the media do not create, but mainly
reinforce opinions. This supported the traditional argument that the
media tend not to reach out beyond their ethnocentric social
constructs, but rather reflect the outlook of the society they serve. If
the society is sick or violent, then that is the reality that the articles,
documentaries or news stories reflect. Each community views a
situation, event, crisis or conflict out of their own reality. That is
why Germany and Israel view themselves and each other so
differently. It is only when issues are new and no firm opinions as
yet are held that the possibility exists to influence the ideas of the
audience.
On the international level, there exists a great barrier between
communication and non-communication, which ^lichael Nlarien
in his essay "Non-Communication and the Future," defines as "the
multitude of instances when full communication ought to occur but
does not ."11 In light of linguistic, cultural, historical, geographic and
other obstacles, transmission and reception of a distant reality are an
impossibility. Even if the media had the space, time and budget, too
many other constraints render the media unable to relay every aspect
and element of a foreign nation. "Since most of the news in
Germany and Israel is internal news," explained Michal Limor, an
Israeli producer and reporter who has worked in both countries, "the
share of international news is quite small and necessarily more
shallow. The correspondent, if you have one abroad, must paint a
picture to one side or the other in a one- or two- minute report.
Through this report, he can establish the public opinion of the whole
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country to which he is broadcasting towards one side or the other,
but it isn't likely to be the whole story." 1 2
In the last decade, German and Israeli media have made great
efforts to cover each other in a more in depth and responsible
manner. And while many of their main publications have done
lengthy stories on internal struggles or party leadership ~ sometimes
several pages worth - the reader's efforts to move beyond the "story"
to see the reality are to no avail. Few readers are aware that the
foreign country only appears to be shown through the media. In
essence, the reality is quite different. Foreign correspondents
contracted and sent on location to the West Bank or to Bonn to
report back "the way it is" are, in fact, creators of an image or fairy
tale of the foreign country. In choosing and displaying news, the
editors, newsroom staff, writers and broadcasters play an important
role in shaping (rather than reflecting) political reality.
Despite their innate shortcomings, the world has come to rely
on the media for balance and organization. For in an ever -
expanding and complicated world, the audience yearns for
organization. The news media reflect that pursuit. There seems to
be a continuing effort to establish order among and between
ourselves. That is in fact the role of the diplomat, and that is what
we have come to expect from the media. First we relegate rank
among our own, choosing leaders and influences, and then we
establish walls and borders between ourselves and others. While
television to some extent assists in the transcendence of such walls
and frontiers, it more often and likely assists in the procurement of
order and organization by establishing such walls and frontiers. One
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of the ways in which the media helps delineate the nation and world
is by categorizing any and every aspect of human life, from human
traumas and distant tribes to sports and weather. This organizational
process of naming things is a major role of the news media and,
according to Altschull, one of the critical aspects of human behavior.
It is important to keep in mind the potential effects of such name
calling. For what we call something determines to a large extent
what and how we think of it."13
The way the media divides and labels the world has a lot to do
with the audience's perceptions of the world. The media's use of
categories like "East Bloc," "Third World" or "developing nations"
has a lot to do with the audience’s understanding (or lack of
understanding) of these parts of the world. Whether Israeli media
refer to Germany in terms of "Nazi Germany," the "new West
Germany" or the "Federal Republic" affects the Israeli perception of
Germany and subsequently the relations between the two nations.
The stereotypes and labels created by the news are a result of
the media's tendency to quickly interpret "the other" in ways that
their audience are sure to understand: East versus West, Left versus
Right, superpower versus underdog, etc. In order to capture and
hold their audience, the media try to relate "others" to the audience
by using terms and concepts the audience understands. However, in
reporting across cultural boundaries on unfamiliar subjects, the
terms of the audience may be inappropriate. Such reporting may
show part of the story but not all. What is said may be true but in the
context of the event, it may not have been significant. Rather than
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explaining something substantive about the "other" society, the story
more likely reinforces aspects and convictions of one's own society.
In addition to personal stereotypes created by individual
journalists, there are those that result from the process of news
gathering over time. For the images created by the media are the
culmination and results of journalists and other media personnel
working within set confines. Edward J. Epstein, author of News
From Nowhere
, summarizes the result:
The relatively constant procedures by which
networks select planned events for coverage,
reconstruct them into stories and integrate them
into news programs tend to give stories on the
same subject similar perspectives ." 14
At least for the first two decades, the media of both nations
referred to the ties between Germany and Israel as "special relations,"
thus influencing the audiences' perception of the relations. To call
this relationship "special" is not just an historical reality, it is a clear
expression of a value judgement. The same goes for calling the
Federal Republic "the New Germany," or classifying politicians as
"leftists" or "right-wing." The media in both countries played a
major role in categorizing the nations and politicians both internally
and internationally.
The Media — An Imperfect Reflection
Establishing the nature of relations between Germany and
Israel and the role of the media as diplomat during the last four
decades is no easy task. Without exception, Israel's policy toward
15
Germany and Germany's image in the press show strong symptoms
of schizophrenia. Ambiguity dogged issue after issue. The Israeli
government, like the people, have been divided into two camps -
those looking to the past, opposing any and all ties with Germany
and those looking to the future, who see such ties as essential to
Israel’s interests. Germany's actions and attitudes as defined by the
media can be described in much the same way. The country is
similarly divided by those unwilling to ignore the past and therefore
repent by shying away from any type of criticism of Israel and those
who feel after 40 years of guilt, apologies and reparations, (the
economic assistance given to Israel by Germany as a sort of
compensation for war damages,) "enough is enough." They are the
ones who claim it's time to look beyond (if not away from) Nazi
Germany. While the characters and catastrophes have changed over
the last four decades, the scenes as portrayed by the media have
remained constant from story to story.
In light of the tragic history and circumstances under which
each of these two states emerged, the reason behind this polarity is
understandable. It is further understandable, in light of the media's
tendency to reinforce such polarities. In their search for drama, the
media tend to review and reflect events in black and white, (e.g. Us
versus Them, Good Guys versus Bad Guys.) These simplistic, two-
sided formats of the media have more likely perpetuated polarities
between Germany and Israel than alleviated them.
In addition to their tendency to polarize stories, the media
tend to tell stories that will satisfy the audience's ego. Often times,
the history, habits and expectations of the audience influence the
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aims and purposes of a nation’s media more than the news or
countries the media claim to report on. A review of Israeli and
German news broadcasts and articles since the early 1950s reveals the
media have not necessarily been reporting events of the other
nation, but rather reporting on only those events that would relate
to, interest and touch the audience. This is a contention few
journalists agreed to. Of the German and Israeli journalists I
interviewed during the last few years, the majority claim they are
reflecting as opposed to shaping world events. They are convinced
their versions of "truth" mirror reality and not the audiences'
expectations. They assert with strong conviction that "events, not
news organizations, determine the content of the news." 15 But can
television or any form of media truly mirror reality?
"My role in the news is to broadcast reality," said Joe Bar El,
Israel's manager of Arabic television. 16 His response was typical of
most of the journalists I spoke to. It is perhaps most gratifying for
those of the media to maintain such a myth or belief that their
function is to hold up a mirror to the other nation. But according to
Epstein, a conception of the news media in such mimetic terms
"necessarily requires a certain blindness toward the role of the
organization and organizational routines in the shaping of news
reports and pictures; ... a blindness that leads to a number of serious
misconceptions about the media."17
As opposed to the messengers, carrier pigeons and other
communication devices of ancient days, the modern-day media of
Israel and Germany have offered an immediacy in communications
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previously unknown. Even so, the myth of this mirror media
suggests an immediacy that still does not exist. As Epstein explains.
While it is true that certain events
... are
broadcast live, virtually all of the regular
newscasts, with the exception of the
commentator’s 'lead-ins' and ’lead-outs’ from
the news stories, are prerecorded on film, which
must be transported, processed, edited and
projected, or on videotape, before it can be seen.
In most cases immediacy is thus illusory
... The
notion of a ’mirror of society' implies that
whatever happens of significance will be reflected
on the news . 18
The mirror analogy tends to neglect the component of ’will,’
or decisions made in advance to cover or not to cover certain types of
events. Rather than make such an admission, the media are more
likely to deliver a slogan that convinces the audience they are
receiving the news on the minute as eyewitnesses on the scene. Just
as we do in the United States, the German and Israeli media use
certain slogans to sell their product, claiming to be immediate,
independent and impartial.
Rather than a mirror or a window on the world, the news is
the great magnifying glass, choosing a line of a book or a portion of a
map and focusing in on it. Rarely, if ever, does the audience see the
entire text. Their attention is guided in certain but not all directions.
As Maxwell McCombs and Donald Shaw concluded in "The Agenda
Setting Function of the Mass Media," the media "are constantly
presenting objects, suggesting what individuals in the mass should
think about, know about, have feelings about."19 That, in fact is the
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job of the editor, who is paid to pick out the "essentials" of a story
and toss out the rest.
Thus, the message imparted by the media is more a reflection
of the policies and predecisions of those who create the news than of
the happening itself. What has been transmitted about Israel and
Germany to either country has depended on where the
correspondent was located, the budget he or she was granted and the
audience for whom the story was being written. It isn’t reality that is
reported, it is what the organization was best able to capture in the
least amount of time on a very limited budget in a specific location.
But the media never admits that the process of news gathering has
innate limitations and that only part of the story is given in the
limited time slots and column inches. As Epstein writes, "Like map
making, news cannot realistically hope to produce a model which
perfectly represents all the contours and elevations of reality, but at
least the basic distortions in any given mode of projection can be
clarified ."20
In his essay "The Distorting Mirror," E. Alexander points out
that the injunction to hold up a mirror to nature sounds sensible
enough until we remember that mirrors may be dirty or clean,
concave or convex, cracked or whole; and that everything depends
on which portion of nature you choose to reflect, how often you
reflect it and how much you reveal of the history of the reflected
images. "To describe the mass media as mirroring events necessarily
involves seriously neglecting the importance of the chain of
decisions made both before and after the fact by executives and
newspeople, or, in a word, the organizational process ."21
19
It is more realistic to say that the media are most concerned
with reporting or mirroring that which will interest the audience.
They must report the news as it fits their audiences expectations and
desires. The audience must be able to easily relate to the event.
More often than not, the mirror is held up to the audience.
Even now, more than 40 years after the Holocaust, the Israeli
media remain conscious of their audience's sensitivities toward
Germany. For years the audio on news reels which included
German speakers was turned down and dubbed in Hebrew. German
movies were dubbed or subtitled. The German language rarely if
ever was transmitted over the Israeli airwaves. This doubtless
affected the Israelis attitude toward both the German language and
the people of Germany. Only recently has the Israeli media loosened
its boycott on the German language, opting for a wider coverage of
Germany. Likewise, German media have become increasingly more
tolerant of reports critical of Israel. This gradual shift in the media of
both countries is bound to have an effect on future relations.
However, my intention here is not to predict the future. My purpose




THE CASE OF GERMANY AND ISRAEL
"Special Relationship"
The ties between the Federal Republic of Germany and the State of
Israel have long been described by the Israeli press under the code word
special relationship." As a result of their special historical relations, there
have been special financial relations, special diplomatic relations, special
cultural and sports-related relations and special expectations of one another
unparalleled by any two other countries.
An examination of the West German press in their coverage of Israel
also reveals a "special" approach. For many years, the Germans were
reserved in their coverage of Israel, revealing part of the story but not all.
In the first few decades, the Israeli was often portrayed as the exalted
pioneer in the Holy Land. With the wounds of World War II still very
much inflamed, any critics of Israel were suppressed in the daily press. In
Israel, any reports on Germany were shaded by the horrors of the past.
Nothing was reported without some reference to the Holocaust.
Even after diplomatic relations were established in 1965, relations
between the two nations remained strained at the very least. Now, for more
than two decades. West Germany and Israel have been sending diplomats to
one another and are regularly exchanging heads of state for brief visits.
Cultural and commercial exchanges have gradually increased. German
journalists, once reserved in their criticism of Israel, are hard pressed
to hold anything back. Even so, more than 40 years and some two
generations since the Holocaust, relations between the two countries
are far from normalized. Based on historical intertwining and
extraordinarily intense interaction, the special relationship has
endured. Lilly Gardner Feldman, in The Special Relationship
Between West Germany and Israel
, writes, "The mutual experiences
yielded a psychological response among the two peoples which
fostered the special relationship, and later maintained it."22
What is it that keeps the Germans and Israelis apart from one
another? What holds them within this "special relationship?" Upon
understanding the dynamics and complexity of these countries and
their peoples, my aim is to analyze the role of the media within this
"special relationship" and to find if the media hold some
responsibility for maintaining this relationship as a "special" one.
According to Feldman, "History/intensity and psychology are
both necessary for the development of a special relationship."23
Within the reports and articles of the German and Israeli media,
both history, intensity and psychology in the form of emotional
images are maintained. It is clear that the media of Israel and
Germany treat each other as they treat no other country. Their
coverage of each other is special -- schizophrenic, but special.
Two Nations Bom on the Air
Throughout the developing nations of this century, the press
was of paramount importance within the process that came to be
identified as "nation building." For each country, the press played a
major role in their development of an identity and self-appraisal.
22
Like the nations of Africa upon gaining independence, when Israel
and Germany reestablished themselves as nations, the press was
used to spread the words of political freedom, of nationhood and the
opportunity to assume an honored position among the reputable
nations of the world. As Herbert Altschull writes in Agents of
Power: The Role of the News Media in Human Affairs
, "The belief
was now universal in the power of the press and its companion in
education, the schools, to raise a citizenry dedicated to the principles
of democracy and social justice ."24 Along with the president, the flag,
the national currency and the national soccer team, the media
organizations themselves, particularly the major national
newspapers and radio stations of Israel and Germany, have become
symbols of their country's identity.
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CHAPTER IV
THE MASS MEDIA OF GERMANY AND ISRAEL
When analyzing the mass media of a nation or of two nations such
as Germany and Israel, it is important to ask whether the media as a whole
provide a sufficiently rich marketplace of ideas in terms of themselves and
the other nation. In addition, the analyst must be careful not to mistake
quantity of information with richness and diversity. According to Ben
Bagdikian, one of the foremost media critics, "there is a tendency to avoid
social analysis of media content because it is only partially quantifiable, is
highly subjective, and involves politics and ideologies ."2 Still, such social
analysis is vital in understanding the workings of a particular medium and
its potential effects.
The analyst must determine and be mindful of who and what can
become a part of the media message. The analyst must ask, "How many
voices, how many subgroups of society, how many creators of ideas and
analysis have entry to the mass media?"3 As populations increase, there is a
growing gap between the number of voices in a society and the number heard
in the media. In Israel, for example, only a handful of people out of a
population of three and one-half million decide what's news for the entire
nation. One single Israeli television correspondent in West Germany depicts
Germany for all of Israeli television. Keep in mind, however, this is not so
unusual. For example, at one time there was a CBS correspondent stationed
in Bonn (without any knowledge of German) who was responsible for
reporting all the news from all the German speaking nations for the
United States. Bagdikian warns:
If a powerful system is narrow in its content, its
very power becomes a threat to public
intelligence. Loud noises and masses of trivia do




In spite of such warnings, economic and time constraints do not
allow anything more than narrow coverage, even in the wealthiest
and most powerful of media empires. The journalist, and
subsequently the audience, is forced to make the most sense out of
the least detail.
In their understanding of Israel, the West German must piece
together bits of footage and articles dealing at length with war, the
Palestinians and occupied territories. Little, if anything, is reported
on the daily life of the Israelis. Little, if anything, is reported without
a strong sense of drama and conflict. Though many more Germans
cover Israel than the amount of Israelis covering Germany, there is
still a sense of sameness in reports. In a kind of organized
plagiarism, reporters tend to begin where yesterday's report left off,
or simply reconstruct or reiterate the reports of another broadcast or
article. Certainly individual reporters will offer distinguishable
stories on different people or different parts of Israel, but after
months of close examination of German news reports on Israel,
certain common threads -- common tones and pictures of the West
Bank and of Lebanon — emerge. The day to day coverage is
dreadfully similar.
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Diverse ownership, according to Bagdikian, is a prerequisite to
public tolerance of diversity. It is this acceptance and tolerance of
diversity that will enhance cross-cultural understanding and better
international relations. (It was exactly a lack of tolerance that led
nations such as Nazi Germany to destroy bonds and relations
between cultures.) For, a public that has been conditioned to a
narrow range of ideas will come to regard this narrowness as the
only acceptable condition.
With these thoughts in mind, I examined the makeup of the
German and Israeli media, two countries where people seem
obsessed with - perhaps even addicted to -- the media. The major
media of each nation, influenced by ownership and the audience to
which they report, select not only which events will be portrayed as
national and world news, but also which parts of the taped or printed
portions of those events will be left out. It is the media of both these
nations that have the final say on what parts of a report will stand for
the whole story. And the symbols chosen to represent the different
aspects of a particular society will become a part of the definition of
that society for the reader or viewers.
For example, the soldier has become the symbol of choice for
German media stories on Israel. And in the minds of the German
viewer, the soldier is likely the symbol of all of Israel. And even for
the young generations of Israel, pictures of neo-Nazis transcend into
symbols of all of Germany. For these symbols are used and reused; so
much so that the symbols, headlines, graphics and approaches of last
night's stories will doubtless be repeated again tonight when
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updating or reporting on a similar story. The stereotypes tend to be
self-perpetuating.
The news reports and symbols for those stories chosen by the
media shape the perceptions of the other country for the millions of
viewers and readers in Israel and Germany. Those issues which
receive the most coverage (reparations, Nazi war trials, diplomatic
visits, arms sales, etc.,) become the pictures in an album of managed
reality. With this album, each nation is provided with its own
individual shared political experiences and "reality." Surely, if each
country received news from the same source and from the same
perspective, the nature of public opinion and political relations
would likely be different. But each country has its own glasses
through which it views the other and through which it forms mass
political stands. The media in each country serve as behavior and
attitude models. In the process of image creation, the media indicate
which attitudes and behaviors are acceptable and even praiseworthy
and which are unacceptable or outside of the mainstream.
The more distant an image is from an individual's zone of
relevance, the more potent the power of the media to create a reality.
Thus, when the Germans report on an issue like Israel, an aspect of
the world that most Germans experience only through the media
rather than directly, the German media have the ability to paint in
any color -- to actually create 'reality' and even a controversy where
none exists. The fact that most Germans and Israelis rely on
television to teach them about the events of the world is evident. In
Germany, my research attested to the fact that those who are avid TV
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viewers profess to know more about Israel than those who are not.
The television is their source of 'reality'.
The German Media
A random survey conducted in 1985 showed that out of every
100 households in the Federal Republic of Germany, 95 have at least
one television, and one radio and 77 subscribe to or regularly
purchase a newspaper. The media, in short, is all-penetrating. In an
average work day, over 95 percent of the population will be reached
by either a television, radio, newspaper or all three. More than 50
percent of the population watch the news daily and another 25
percent watch it several times a week.28
The proper measure of a country's mass media, however, is
not the number of homes reached, but rather the quality of the
message communicated. According to Bagdikian, the appropriate
measure of a nation's media is "whether by thorough examination
and reporting, they increase understanding of important realities,
and whether through presentation of the widest possible spectrum of
thought and analysis, they create an adequate reservoir of insights
into the social process."29 If the media do not produce a rich
marketplace of ideas and serious information, they fail a prime
function. Though this may once have been acceptable in primitive
and unchanging times, it is not today. For in a dynamic society,
especially a democracy in a changing world, a lack of diversity in fact
and thought leaves a population partially blinded. Bagdikian
maintains that diversity and richness in the media are not
ornaments of a democracy but essential elements for its survival.
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Especially on the international level and within these nuclear times,
a better, richer and more diverse understanding of other nations and
cultures is vital to international and even global survival.
The German Print Media
The German press is almost exclusively organized in private
business. At present, there are just over 500 daily and weekly
newspapers with an estimated cumulative press run of
approximately 21 million copies per issue. The number of
newspapers with a completely autonomous editorial staff which
produces its total editorial content has shrunk from 225 in the early
1950s to less than 100 in the 1980s. In addition to the daily and weekly
newspapers, there are about 230 popular magazines which appear
either weekly, bi-weekly or monthly and which have a cumulative
press run of about 63 million copies per issue. Complementing these
are the innumerable trade journals, school, office and professional
publications, circulars, customer and home magazines. The number
of professional magazines alone is estimated to be much more than
10,000 titles.
Similar to the trend in the United States, the general rising
costs and the introduction of ever more sophisticated and costly
techniques and machinery within the print medium have forced
smaller companies either to enter into amalgamation with others or
to be taken over by one of the giants in the publishing business -- a
situation that also suggests parallels with developments in Germany
in the early decades of this century.
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The German press is quite free of government control. No
daily is directly owned by a political party, and though some ten
percent of papers support a party line, the majority of newspapers,
including all major dailies, are politically independent. The most
important and influential national dailies include Frankfurter
Allgemeine Zeitung, Siiddeutsche Zeitung of Munich and Die Welt
of Hamburg, all of which maintain equal circulations of
approximately 350,000.
The Influence of Axel Springer
A discussion of press concentration in Germany would not be
complete without mention of the publishing empire of Axel Caesar
Springer (1912 - 1985). At the time of his death. Springer's share of
the West German daily newspaper market stood at over 30 percent.
His conglomeration of press within Hamburg and West Berlin are
still between 60 and 70 percent. The nearest rivals to the
concentrated ownership of the Springer empire controls a mere three
percent.
In general, it is West Germany's boulevard press that enjoys
the largest circulation. One of the most successful of these tabloids.
Die Bild Zeitung, is owned by the Springer empire. The Bild, filled
with gossip of the private lives of celebrities and exotic crimes, is
Germany's only real "national" daily. With a circulation of 5,400,000
papers, printed in eight different provincial centers, the Bild is read
by almost a third of the country's adult population. Its layout is
comparable to U.S. supermarket tabloids; similarly, the Bild is
known for never letting the facts get in the way of a good story.
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In addition to the most popular daily paper, Springer also
publishes the European continent's widest selling weekly, Hor Zu,
with a circulation topping four million. Springer's monopoly of
national Sunday papers is total: Only two major Sunday papers exist
in West Germany, B ild am Sonntag and Welt am Sonntag, and both
belong to the Springer press, as does one of the country's four widely
distributed quality dailies. Die Welt, and its biggest evening paper.
Hamburger Abendblatt.
But Springer didn’t stop there. He also added two publishing
houses and other ventures that turned the Springer organization
into the largest concentration of newspaper ownership anywhere in
the world. The fact that this major media monopoly was established
by Springer is significant. For Axel Springer was one of the most
visible, vocal and powerful supporters of Israel in all of West
Germany. That a man in Springer's position can exert immense
power in the shaping and directing of public opinion is obvious. His
power to influence public opinion through the Bild has met with
strong criticism from the Left, who claim the empire is too
conservative, too narrow in its coverage and far too powerful.
The Springer press are perfect examples of newspapers and
journalism that reflect the readers' views rather than the news. The
papers are conservative in nature, with a clear emphasis on law and
order. Showing West Germany as the "good guys," the messages
they muster offer a sense of national unity while pointing to the
enemy, which is most assuredly the Communist East -- the Soviet
Union and, above all, the German Democratic Republic. Concepts,
countries and calamities are oversimplified to the point of
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inaccuracy. National pride and "fluffy-cutsie" stories are used to
cover over any conflict or division within society. The paper is
meant to give the reader a sense of belonging. Springer himself
formulated some of his objectives in an advertisement that appeared
in the London Times in June, 1969 :
The Axel Springer publications stand for progress
but oppose all attempts to destroy or subvert our
society; support all peaceful moves to restore
German unity in freedom; work for
reconciliation between the Jewish and the
German people
; reject any kind of political
extremism; uphold the liberal market economy.
[Emphasis added.]
In the case of the Springer press, or any press for that matter, it
is difficult, if not impossible, to prove any direct effects of their
portrayal of the world. It’s like the old question of which came first,
the chicken or the egg. Does the mass media, like the widely-read
Bild, reflect public opinion or does this popular press shape public
opinion or both. Most authors on the subject maintain that the
relationship between the two is a symbiotic one.
The Germans are often described as "square,” rigidly holding
on to their ways, beliefs and stereotypes. They will do anything to
avoid taking risks. They are a people in search of stability and
financial and social order. In light of their history, this description is
perhaps understandable. The average elderly readers, having
survived two world wars, have seen the rise and fall of two Empires
and one Republic, the destruction of an economy, bestial misuse of
power, the uprooting of vast numbers of the populations and the
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division and loss of half their country. As John Sanford puts it in
Mass Media of the German Speaking Countries, "It is not surprising
that many West Germans cling with almost neurotic obsessiveness
to the system they see as having raised them from the rubble and
chaos of 1945 to their present affluence and stability. The greatest fear
- and it is very deep rooted in many older Germans - is of change, of
anything that might conceivably tip their country back into the old
anarchy and wretchedness."30
The success of the Bild most likely means the public is
comfortable with the paper's "reflection" of the world - simple,
sensational, gemutlich. The readers are looking for those pieces of
information that will interest them but not attack them. And their
interest is best perked by easily recognizable and palpable images, and
conversely, most distracted by unfamiliar or confusing images; thus
Israel's complex issues are presented in terms of human experience
rather than abstract ideas. In order to entice the reader, papers like
the Bild are quick to interpret "the other" (e.g. Israel) in ways that
their audience are sure to understand — Left versus Right,
superpower versus underdog, etc. Parts or aspects of a story are
amplified and others are left out for lack of sex appeal. While a story
may include a beginning, middle and an end, they may all three
have been fabricated or subjectively chosen. It is a problem that
journalists are faced with every day -- trying to decide which portion
of a story is necessary and easily understood and which is not.
Ulrich Sahm, a German correspondent who has reported on
Israel for over a decade, explained the difficulty:
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I have to present the Germans with an incredible
amount of very complicated material concerning
religious affairs or Israeli politics. Things that are
culturally essential in Israel sound absolutely
ridiculous to anybody else. Try telling a German
what mikve means or brit melah. I have to
decide to what degree these things interest the
Germans and what is the minimum that I can
tell them so they have at least some idea of
what’s going on in Israel. First I have to think
about my readers because I'm going to have to
sell my story .31
Perhaps it is vanity that causes people to look for reflections of
themselves and their own experience in the media. For the audience
will tend to select those parts of an argument they agree with and
ignore the parts they object to or put them down as "lies." Through
selective retention, the reader will choose to remember those
messages that support already existing beliefs and forget opposing
facts. A newspaper, for example, is usually selected if it reflects or
conforms to the readers’ own opinions and political convictions.
The mass media of nations of the free world are expected to reinforce
the already existing opinions of the readers and listeners. In this
respect, the media are not affecting a change, but rather reinforcing
and reiterating firmly planted views.
While popular newspapers like the Bild may not play a major
and direct role among politicians, they do play main roles as agenda
setters and meters of public opinion. The Bild, for example,
reinforces a longing for stability. It plugs itself as the great watchdog
and guardian of the Federal Republic. The Bild carries the image of
keeping the enemy under the light, while praising the power of West
Germany. Springer once recognized the Germans' fear of self
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criticism coupled with their fear of someone upsetting the status quo
when he said, "There was one thing the German reader did not wish
- to think about anything.'^ It seems that reality is not the goal of
this popular press, entertainment through self-aggrandizement is.
German Television
Unlike West Germany's print media, German television and
radio, until now, have been exclusively organized under public
ownership and control and extensively correspond to the federal
political structure. (However, at the time of this writing, cable was
stretching its web throughout Germany, greatly expanding the
possibilities for private ownership.)
Germany s first regular transmission of a television program
started up on November 1, 1954 on station ARD. Since then, two
more networks have established themselves. The First Programme
is produced by ARD (Association for Public Law Broadcasting
Organizations of the Federal Republic of Germany.) The Second
Programme, ZDF, is completely separate and is controlled by a public
corporation of all the lander (German states.) It is partly financed by
advertising. The Third Programme provides cultural and
educational service in the evening organized by several regional
public bodies.
In June 1984, there were 27,856,997 radio receivers and
33,340,623 television receivers in use in the Federal Republic. But
the addition of three television networks, countless radios and
televisions doesn't necessarily lend itself to better communication.
It's is proof of the fact that more communication through added
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technology is not necessarily better. Virtually all of the pictures of
national and world news seen on television in Germany are the
product of three government run news organizations. While these
stations may vary in style or personality, their differences are minor
on any realistic scale of the total values of society. Similar to the
three major U.S. networks, there are no real differences in the
content or approach between the German networks. At each station,
the process by which the news is gathered, edited and presented to
the public is more or less similar. They share a narrow, common
outlook, not out of a conspiracy, but out of the constraints of a
government-run operation. The economics and politics of the
station are geared at sustaining the status quo. The German
television media are an institution of the country, not unlike other
federal institutions. The networks therefore have certain self-
interests as does any individual or institution. The difference
between the media and other institutions is that the media have
power over public opinion and debate and are thus better able to
pursue their self-interests.
The potential power and the expanded quantity of messages
fed to the German audience does not, however, guarantee expanded
quality of information nor the relation of the information to reality.
By the time the millions of messages of the media reach the
audience, they have already been through a complex filtration
process. Consider what occurs:
a. Something happens in government. [In the Israeli parliament, for
example.}
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b. Government officials decide how to announce or present this occurrence.
This may differ from (a).
c. Through a press secretary, the news media are presented with this
government announcement. This may differ from (a) and (b).
d. A reporter produces a story of the occurrence. This may differ from (a), (b)
and (c).
e. The media organizations processes the reporter's story for presentation to
the public, either directly or through its client newspapers and broadcast stations.
This may differ from (a), (b), (c) and (d).
/. The public receives an image of the occurrence. This may differ from (a),
(b), (c), (d) and (e).33
Second-Hand Relations
Though it is rarely acknowledged, our perspectives on the
world are based on second-, third-, fourth-, even fifth-hand
information. Without knowledge of the screening and filtering
process that transpires between the event and the article or newsreel,
the audience responds as if the media had actually created a mirror of
reality. Of the average Germans and Israelis I interviewed, few, if
any, were familiar with the processing of information that occurs in
news making in order to fit time slots and budgets. They were
unaware, or at least not willing to admit that their opinions were
based on synthetic news stories and partial information. They were
seemingly unaware of the media's organizational inputs -- economic
and political considerations -- which influence the output of the
news. Ultimately, the output is what colors the audiences'
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perspective of the other nation, perspectives based on subjective
distortions of reality.
The Israeli Media
Like the Germans, the Israelis are news hungry. Faced with
constant conflict and life-threatening situations, the Israelis are avid
newspaper readers. The news is broadcast hourly on the radio - and
they listen. And, despite the poor quality programs on their one
television station (due to a meager budget), they are avid television
viewers, as well. Most of all, they love to read about themselves.
They continue to show strong interest in reports about Israel that
appear in the foreign press. Such reports are consistently replayed in
the Israeli media. While U.S. media are apt to quote the New York
Times, Tass, Reuters, or other news services, there is barely a limit to
the number of papers the Israeli media will quote if the subject is
Israel.
The Israelis' powerful interest in the news and the existence of
hourly broadcasts puts a lot of pressure on the media to produce.
"The need for news every hour creates a lot of artificial news," said
Uri Savir, the media adviser and press officer for the Israeli prime
minister. "There is a tremendous vacuum here that leaves room for
the politicians to come in and create news. Make one sexy statement
and it's enough to get you on the news in an hour. This room for
news makes politicians do things in order to get printed or aired.
Today almost nothing happens without the politicians translating it
into news. This has an impact on both style and substance."34
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The mass media of Israel are national. Newspapers printed in
Tel Aviv and Jerusalem are nationally distributed. Journalists, both
print and broadcast, are concentrated in both Tel Aviv and
Jerusalem, the seat of government. Geographically, the country is so
small, that the connection between the government and the media is
easily facilitated. So small is the country, in fact, that the
"provincial" or local papers so popular in Germany do not really
exist in Israel. For what happens in the capitol of Jerusalem, directly
impacts the business metropolis of Tel Aviv and vice versa.
Such close relations between the media makers and the
politicians often places the media in an almighty position to
influence (though not necessarily to determine) the timing and focus
of decisions. When the Israeli parliament, the Knesset, is in session,
there are consistently some 25 members of the press on hand. All of
Israel's major papers keep at least two reporters at the Knesset.
According to Sara Yitzhaki, head of the Knesset Press Office, the
foreign journalists assigned to the Knesset pay little attention to
anything but those issues with direct implications for international
affairs. "The media's reports don't directly influence the political
decisions here," said Yitzhaki. "But they greatly influence the
parties, which influence the decisions."35
In the political systems of Israel and Germany, the media are
used as a link between the governed and the governors.
Communications through the media is the glue that holds them
together. The media are used not only to connect the country to the
government but also as a communications channel between political
parties and their members, both for disseminating information and.
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especially at election times, to inject enthusiasm and to boost morale.
The media, by bringing or not bringing certain issues at certain times
to public notice, are, along with the politicians, setting the public
agenda and thus playing an important role in the politics of nations
internally and internationally.
Sitting at his desk in the prime minister's office, Israeli
government media adviser and spokesperson Uri Savir is
surrounded by newspapers and magazines from all over the world.
The nearly one dozen telephones that surround him are ringing
constantly with calls from Israeli politicians and journalists from
every corner of the globe. The study of this connection between
media and politics has become Savir's main occupation — his
lifeline:
Today there is such an enormous symbiosis
between the government and media that it is
hard to distinguish what starts where. Many
politicians today behave like journalists and
many journalists behave like politicians
... Today
nothing is done without taking into account the
impact of the media. There is an
interdependence between us. They [the media]
need us for information and we need them for
the kind of news we want to deliver. What I'm
doing for the government is translating
government policies into news .36
In the age of image politics, politicians in both countries rely
on the media in order to matter. And the media of both countries
rely on the politicians. Generally, politicians and journalists agreed
they could not survive without one another. Explained Israeli
journalist Michal Limor:
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Today the politicians are using the media. Thev
cannot function today without the media. They
need the media because a politician only exists if
he is known and if his ideas and that which he
has to say are known. In the modern media, his
face must also be known. Otherwise he does not
exist. And the media needs the politician, because
the politician supplies the stories and is also
responsible for the decisions that are made in
government. And the function of the media is to
expose and to bring out the deeds and misdeeds of
the governmental institutions. So the politicians
need the media in order to expose themselves and
the media need the politicians to cooperate and
leak stories.37
The Israeli Print Media
The number of newspapers supported by the Israelis is great,
indeed. There are some 25 daily papers - 13 Hebrew, 4 Arabic, and to
serve the various waves of immigration, one each in English,
French, German, Yiddish, Polish, Romanian, Hungarian and
Russian - for a population of less than four million. The most
widely read, by both politicians, Israelis and foreign correspondents,
are the Hebrew dailies and the English daily, The Jerusalem Post.
(These are also the papers I concentrated on.) The other papers seem
to hold only a marginal journalistic or editorial impact. They are
read by only a third of the population and are rarely quoted in the
foreign press.
Like the dominant German papers, the main Israeli dailies are
privately owned and have no formal affiliation with political parties.
The morning paper Ha'aretz has a circulation of 51,000. Maariv and
Yedioth Achronot are the larger papers with circulations of 140,000
each. The fourth largest Hebrew daily is Davar, with a circulation of
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37,000. Davar is formally the organ of the Histairut, Israel's Labor
Federation. However, the output of the paper depends a great deal
on which party is dominating the Histadrut and how powerful that
party is.
For the Israeli, like the German, the media are less a reflection
of reality and more a reflection of the people and their history.
Rather than attempting to capture the news event, the papers are
attempting to capture a mass audience. For example, as the makeup
of the population has changed, so has the flavor and content of the
news covered. In the last 40 years, the population has shifted from
the pioneers, the ideologically motivated and those who sought
refuge from the Nazis and later from hostile Arab governments, to
their children and grandchildren who are still establishing their
identity as Israelis. The media reflect that shift. Germany, for
example, was once covered with extreme reservations. Now, as the
audience changes, so does the broadcast. Soccer games, cultural
programs, even German movies can now be seen on Israeli
television. Perhaps these types of broadcasts will assist in bringing
the two nations closer together. However, the news of political
developments, exchange of diplomats, heads of state and arms sales,
are still broadcast with strong emphasis on the past, which serves as a
constant pressure point between the two relatively young nations.
With the emergence of a new generation of journalists, views of the
past have changed and serve as less of a constraint in news reporting.
When Israel first declared independence, the journalists and the
press in general shared a commitment to the furthering of the Jewish
State. While there is still strong dedication to the preservation of
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Israel, it has become much easier to take a more critical stance on
government actions and policies.
Israeli Television and Radio
Unlike the Israeli press, the airwaves of Israel are a state
monopoly run by Israel Broadcasting Authority, a public corporation.
In theory, the Authority is apolitical, but in actuality, the members
are appointed by their respective political parties and apportioned
according to party representation in the Knesset. All directors and
major managers of Israeli broadcast news are government
appointees. And, while many claim to be apolitical, objective
broadcasters, they generally conform to Israel’s government policy.
Israel's different radio stations offer a wide variety of musical
and various other cultural programming. Almost every language in
the world is represented at one time or another on the different
stations. But each station, regardless of its type of programming,
carries the same newscast. And the radio newscast is tightly bound to
the television newscast. This close coordination between the radio
and television broadcasts makes for quite a monopoly for the Israeli
government. This monopoly, emphasized by the existence of only
one television station, is a tool of significant political impact,
doubtless promoting a somewhat homogeneous view of the outside
world for the Israeli viewers and listeners. (At the time of my
research, the government had just approved tentative plans to create
a second television network.)
Foreign correspondents in Israel have played an increasingly
significant part in enlarging the amount of information in
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circulation in Israel. Since its establishment, Israel has remained a
hot and coveted news beat
. And ever since the Six-Day-War of 1967
and increasingly since the Yom Kippur War of 1973, rarely a day goes
by without some word from Israel. Every major news organization
in the world is represented, with the exception of those from
countries with which Israel still does not share diplomatic relations,
such as Soviet Bloc nations. The Israeli journalist has learned to use
this foreign press corps to his advantage. Unlike the foreign
correspondent, the Israeli journalist is faced with serious censorship
on issues dealing with the military and national security. However,
there is nothing to stop the Israeli journalist from quoting foreign
media sources. Thus, it is not uncommon for an Israeli to leak a
story to a foreign journalist and then quote the foreigner in order to
circumvent stringent legal sanctions.
In addition to his own instincts and the occasional assistance
of an Israeli journalist, the foreign correspondent in Israel is likely to
gather information from the government, which has developed a
strong official network for the dissemination of information. The
more influential spokesmen in both local and international media
include those for defense, the foreign ministry and the military.
These are the voices most often quoted in the German media.
Spokesmen for labor and finance are of interest to the Israeli press
but are rarely quoted outside of Israel.
Realizing the importance of coordinating information for the
media, in the last decade care has been taken to establish a more
formal system of information distribution from the prime minister's
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office. All information emanating from this office is channeled
through the press officer. Said Savir:
I'm trying to influence what the media are
saying. Today the press officer plays a more
manipulative role. Really what we're doing is
shading the press the best way for our own
government. Domestically it’s [the Prime
Minister] versus everybody, and internationally
it's Israel versus everybody. We try to paint the
news the way we want to see it. We have a
tremendous amount of power in terms of what
they're going to report.38
In recent years, serious attempts have been made to coordinate
Israel’s information efforts abroad. Rather than pictures of soldiers,
military and war, the Israelis are hoping to communicate other
aspects of daily Israeli life. One such project began in Germany in
1985 under the direction of Michal Limor:
My goal is to expose Israel more than it is exposed
now to the German public. This program can
expose the daily life of Israel; the things that happen
in Israel not only which are interesting to the news
people but things that happen behind the news as
background. Once things like this are brought to
the viewer in Germany, of course his attitude
toward Israel can be changed altogether. The
attitude of viewers toward what they see in
television is normally black and white. They get
either the good guys, the heroes or the bad guys.
That is the normal approach of the news. But once
they see longer stories, background stories, other
stories, they'll start to understand or to accept that it
is not black and white and that there are many
degrees. The bad guys are not always bad or only
bad and there are sometimes grays and pinks and
the good guys are not always good. They are also
sometimes bad. The reality comes out. It is
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8 that contributes to the better image of
While it is still too early to gauge the reaction to Limor's broadcasts,
it is interesting to note the extent to which the Israelis are relying on
the media to assist in improving their image among the Germans.
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CHAPTER V
THE MEDIA'S ROLE IN WEST GERMAN/ISRAELI RELATIONS
The German and the Israeli have access to an extraordinary volume
of media output in print, broadcasting and recordings. Each morning the
German wakes up, turns on the radio during breakfast, begins the morning
paper, finishing it on the streetcar on the way to work. The radio is on at
the office and when he arrives home, dinner will be accompanied or
followed by a substantial amount of hours in front of the television set.
Meanwhile, the Israeli is following much the same routine. He reads the
paper every morning on the bus and the bus driver will play the radio,
turning it up every hour, enabling the entire bus to hear the news report.
As in Germany, radio and television will accompany the Israeli through
their afternoon and evening.
It is difficult to gauge how this media saturation is affecting the non-
media communication and perceptions in these two nations. However, it is
clear that in both societies, people have turned to the media for positioning.
Faced with ever-changing and shifting situations, the Israeli and German rely
on radio, television and the press for bearings. In their search for self-image,
self-appraisal and belonging, they have come to count on the media. The
media, in turn, plug themselves as the guiding light, offering heroes, villains
and public values. After 40 years, the relationship between the Israeli and
German public and their respective mass media, has grown, expanded and
solidified. A brief glance into the history of Israel or the history of West
Germany exemplifies again and again the pivotal role this
relationship played on the politics of the nation and between the two
nations.
The 1950s -- Reparations
As already stated, the relations between West Germany and
Israel are marked by the scars of history. The scars are deep, passing
from one generation to the next and leaving the two countries in an
often ambiguous relationship. Germany wanted to establish good
relations without giving up too much and Israel wanted to avoid
making enemies, but remained unwilling to forget the past.
Throughout, the media played narrator, moderator and mediator.
From 1948 through 1951, there is a noticeable veil of silence in
the media of both Germany and Israel on the subject of their tragic
past. Sifting through the yellowed papers and clips of the times, little
if anything is to be found. The focus was on building. Of this,
Feldman writes, "Feelings, whether of horror or guilt on the German
side, or of grief and hostility on the Israeli side, simply were not
expressed on a large scale or in any public or official way."40
Demonstrating the role of the media during the initial years of
nationhood of Israel and the Federal Republic is an article published
in the Munich Neue Zeitung on August 31, 1951. The article, written
by German journalist Erich Leuth, is credited later by historians for
launching the process that culminated in the signing of the
German /Israeli reparations agreement a year later.
"Wir bitten Israel um Frieden," (We ask Israel for peace)
appeared as an editorial in the liberal Munich daily on that date and
in the Social Democratic Telegraph of West Berlin the following day,
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coinciding with the publication of a similar article entitled "Friede
mit Israel/' (Peace with Israel) by Rudolf Kiistermeier in the
independent Hamburg Die Welt. (At that time Die Welt was owned
by the British. Springer bought the paper in 1953.)
The two articles had an electrifying effect in Germany. Leuth
and Kiistermeier had pierced the silence. Their articles were
reprinted fully or in part in many other newspapers and long extracts
were read over various radio stations. During round-table
discussions held on North West Germany Radio, it was proposed
that a dialogue be opened between the two countries. One
immediate "effect" of the enthusiastic reception of the Leuth and
Kiistermeier articles was the birth of the "Peace for Israel"
movement, which served as a strong lobby for relations between the
two nations. In addition, the articles seemed to have a profound
affect on the way relations between the two and the subject of
German /Israeli relations were thought of. Six months prior to their
printing, Israel's call for reparations had met with very little
response anywhere in the world and least of all from Bonn.
Suddenly that changed.
In his article, Leuth did not attack his readers. He was able to
make the reader feel like the good guy, the innocent victim -- an
approach often used in Germany within articles and discussions of
the Holocaust. Lueth told his fellow German that he was, of course,
aware of "the thousands of Socialists, Democrats and Christians who,
because of their resistance to the Nazi regime, shared in Hitler's
concentration camps the death as their Jewish brethren." Leuth went
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open communication
on to call for Germany to speak to Jews and
between Germany and Israel.
While the messages transmitted in Germany during the early
1950s were slow to reach Israel, once they did, the echoes of Leuth's
articles were heard. No article was written in response, but a letter
was sent from the office of the Israeli prime minister directly to
Leuth, praising Leuth for his efforts in the press and calling for a
beginning of reparations. Leuth relayed the letter to proper
authorities within the German government. Since then, the
German/Israeli dialogue has virtually never ceased. And
throughout, the media has played an integral, albeit ambiguous, role.
Within one month after the media's initiation of the "Peace
with Israel movement, the German government reacted. Taking
his cue from the media and the subsequent public reaction,
Germany's Chancellor Konrad Adenauer finally broke the
government silence. At the end of September 1951, speaking before
the Bundestag, Adenauer declared, "The Federal Government are
prepared, jointly with representatives of Jewry and the State of Israel
... to bring about a solution of the material indemnity problem, thus
easing the way to the spiritual settlement of infinite suffering."41
Leafing through the articles of the early 1950s, the indecision
and lack of clarity that characterized the issue of reparations is readily
apparent. The controversy blown up by the articles of the day was
between those who were demanding assistance in the rehabilitation
of the survivors in Israel and at least partial payment for plundered
Jewish property, and those outraged by the thought. Their exact
reasoning was often unclear. But each article is formed into two
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sides. There were those who totally opposed permitting the
Germans to make amends, charging that Germany was interested
only in gaining readmission to the family of nations. They opposed
any contact with Germany. Others, especially Mapam, a small
socialist party, did not oppose reparations in principle but were
against Israel's negotiating with the Germans. The government, too,
declared that reparations did not mean "forgiving and forgetting"
and it did not envisage forming ties with Germany.
In both countries, the media was used as a forum for the
public outcry. And while messages were sent between the two
nations, the echoes were slow and relations, diplomatic and cultural,
were almost non-existent. Such a situation allowed for limited
communication. In general, the early 1950s are marked by crippled
relations. Each nation was apparently more interested in
establishing itself than opening up to each other. Even more than
the Germans, the Israelis were very slow to break their silence.
However, once the media reported on the establishment of direct
negotiations with Germany, the Israeli public exploded.
On January 7, 1952, in one of the largest and most aggressive
protests on the steps of the Knesset, hundreds came to show their
opposition to contacts with Germany. The army had to be called in
to supplement the police force. The tension was reflected in the
press accounts of the protest. The New York Times reported:
A mob of 1,000 adherents of the extreme right-
wing Herut Party today stormed through police
barricades, set fire to or demolished automobiles,
and stoned the Knesset building ... Steel-
helmeted policemen, carrying ... shields to protect
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themselves from a shower of stones, fought the
mob with tear gas, smoke bombs and nightsticks
Tear gas poured into the building through broken
windows.42
Not surprisingly, the media focused on the conduct of the protesters
rather than the content of the problem. This is a phenomenon that
remains in the media still today. When the German news reports on
the Palestinians of the West Bank, it is not their history, hopes and
aspirations that is reported, but rather their actions, the numbers
wounded and killed.
Only a week before the January 1952 protest, the Israeli daily
Maariv had conducted a poll that reported 80 percent of those
surveyed were against negotiations with Germany.-*! Media and
government were painted with intense emotion. Nowhere was
there any sign of a middle ground. But the issue was intensified. To
the backdrop of the conflict between those calling for negotiations
and those refusing any contact with Germany, direct negotiations
between West Germany and Israel opened in March 1952. In spite of
strong opposition, the Reparations Agreement between the two
countries was signed that year. The parameters of the debate
implanted by the media of the early 1950s were institutionalized,
setting the framework for media, policy and public opinion to the
present day.
The decision of Israel's to seek and accept economic assistance
from West Germany culminated in the signing of a Reparations
Agreement in Luxembourg in September, 1952. Israel desperately
needed the financial assistance and Germany was in need of political
rehabilitation. The Agreement laid the basis for continuously
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expanding ties between the two countries. The sudden flow of
economic support from Germany served as the impetus for a flow of
media coverage. And the governments of both nations began to take
the power of the media more seriously. On one occasion, the Israeli
Minister of the Interior tried to use his powers under the Press
Ordinance, 1933, to prevent the official organ of a right-wing
opposition party (Herut) from publicly attacking the government's
policy. After issuing an initial warning to the editor, the minister
did not carry out the threat* The first prime minister, David Ben
Gurion, who strongly supported the policy of building relations with
Germany, tried over the next several years to keep the issue out of
the media and away from the public eye. In the late 1950s, this policy
led to a showdown within his cabinet in which the press had an
important role.
In December, 1957, Ben Gurion planned to send Moshe Dayan,
who had concluded his term as chief of staff to West Germany, to
negotiate an arms deal. But suddenly the echoes of the media from
overseas were getting louder. Though the cabinet was not informed
of the decision, one of its members, a representative of Mapam, read
of the decision in a German news magazine. The member brought
the matter up in a cabinet meeting. Ben Gurion called for a vote and
his policy was narrowly approved despite the opposition of Mapam
ministers and Ahdut Ha'avoda, two of the smaller parties in the
government.
The very next day, the Ahdut Ha'avoda newspaper,
Lamerhav, carried a front page story headlined, "Ahdut Ha'avoda
Demands an Urgent Cabinet Meeting to Cancel a Grave Decision."
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The article did not mention the nature of the decisions, but asserted
that parliamentary representatives of the party were shocked.
Another paper partially disclosed the content of the decision when it
wrote that Ben Gurion cancelled the defense mission to Germany
because Ahdut Ha'avoda leaked the story to further its electoral
interests.
These incidents in the press sparked a government crisis. Ben
Gurion demanded the resignation of the Ahdut Ha’avoda ministers.
When they refused to resign, he resigned. Under Israeli law, the
resignation of the prime minister automatically results in the
resignation of the entire cabinet. Ben Gurion refused to re-form a
new government until he secured a promise that legislative steps
would be taken forthwith to tighten secrecy procedures to prevent
leaks from cabinet meetings to the press. Eventually, some ten years
later, the pledge resulted in the passage of such a law, but by this
time, "leaks" were an integral part of government/media relations.
Since the early 1950s, whenever division has haunted the
Israeli cabinet, an all-too -common occurrence, the media has been
put to work. For the past generation of politicians, it was good
strategy to publicize disagreements in order to maximize support in
the party and with the general public. Calculated leaks serve this
purpose well.
Throughout the 1950s, the media reported on the reparations,
the political debates and political relations — or lack of — between
Germany and Israel. No attempts were made in Israel to report
Germany as it actually was: reforming, redeveloping, reblooming.
Rather than portray Germany's return to the arts and culture, all
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stories on Germany within the Israeli media were written and read
through the glasses of the Holocaust. Had coverage been less focused
on the past, perhaps relations would have developed differently.
Instead, relations remained stained and strained. The media and the
people hold tightly to the Holocaust. The dilemma was widened by
the fact that the government, reflecting the nation as a whole, never
really was able to decide whether to deal with the new Germany or
yesterday's Third Reich.
Thus, the words of the journalist catering to the Israeli
audience, immediately became embroiled in the emotions imprinted
by the past, and the words and policy became ambiguous. This was a
neurosis shared by both countries. For what Israel cannot forget, the
Germans are unwilling to remember. They were quick to avoid the
Holocaust, choosing rather to emphasize the bold steps of the Israeli
and the assistance of Germany in Israel through reparations.
In short, the two countries were not communicating on the
same level. They each created and maintained their own realities.
As the 1950s turned to the 1960s, the moral dialogue in Germany was
ending. Israel continued to speak of Germany's obligations and
Germany began to speak in terms of her interests. The average
German still knew little of this small country of Israel. Even with
the intensive expansion of economic relations, for most Germans,
Israel remained a faraway, unknown and unvisited land. Few
Germans were granted visas to Israel. In 1955, a total of 497 German
citizens traveled to Israel. For the majority of Germans, however,
information about the new Jewish State remained unclear and
exotic. Only toward the end of the 1950s did the Germans begin
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traveling in larger numbers to Israel, eventually becoming one of
Israel's largest tourist groups.45
The 1960s — The Eichmann Trial
The turning point on the stage of German/Israeli relations
came in 1961. And the media played the leading role. In March of
that year, German television stations commissioned copies of the
videotape of the trials of Nazi war criminal Adolf Eichmann. The
following month, the trials were broadcast over German television,
which made the headlines in Israeli papers. But the direct effect was
not seen in Israel. In Germany, however, the effects were powerful,
indeed.
The airing of the Eichmann trial on public television
represented a change of policy for all German media. Suddenly the
unspoken and the nameless was reawakened. The trial was shown
together with an hour-long documentary on the life of Eichmann.
For millions of West Germans, the trial and subsequent film were
their first views of the Nazi atrocities. For others who had long
chosen indifference or resentment on the subject of the Holocaust,
the film and trial pushed them to think differently. The effects of
television were almost immediate.
Only the night before the viewing of the Eichmann trial began,
swastika daubings were reported to have taken place in Germany but
there was no report of protest. Following the Eichmann broadcast,
the swastika daubings were suddenly protested in full force. In a
small town in Westphalia, the Jerusalem Post reported that the local
branch of a German Trade Union Federation held demonstrations.
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Factories in the town of 20,000 closed early to enable employees to
take part in a protest, march and rally.
For more than a month, the Eichmann trial was given
extensive coverage in the German press and on radio and television,
undoubtedly having a great impression on the German government
and the German public at large. German media gave more detailed
coverage to the trial than any other nation in the world. Still
without television, Israel was unable to air the trial. But the
coverage in Germany reopened the Federal Republic to a past that
had been locked for more than a decade. According to reports in the
Jerusalem Post, major cinemas in Germany began screening such
films as "Mein Kampf" and "Eichmann und das Dritte Reich," both
seen by thousands of Germans. Sixteen years after the end of the
war, the media was used to bring the immenseness of the Nazi
crimes against the Jews into the German home.
Immediately after the war, when told of the barbaric deeds of
the Nazis, the defeated and stunned Germans seemed in no mood to
sympathize or read about anyone else but themselves. Apathy and
the will to forget characterized the messages transmitted in the
media for an entire decade after the war. Israel's image in the
German media of the 1950s and into the 1960s is shown through
rose-tinted glasses. Few, if any, imperfections were revealed. As a
rule, German papers were generally supportive of Israel from




The coverage of the Eichmann trial opened many Germans'
eyes. Suddenly the dialogue changed. The press in both countries
were filled with articles and editorials on the subject of
German/Israeli relations. Reacting to the public mood, the media
was setting the agenda - setting the course for future relations. By
July, 1961, the German public began to react. German unions,
students, professors, etc. were now calling for ties with Israel. During
their July convention in Kiel, the Deutsche Gewerkschaftsbund, the
major German union federation, passed a resolution urging the
German government to speed up the establishment of diplomatic
relations with Israel. Such reactions were widely reported in the
Israeli press.
More than any other news event since the end of Nazi
Germany, the Eichmann trial forced the Germans to face facts they
preferred to ignore. Many young German students born after Hitler
died, learned the details of the Gestapo tortures, the gassing of
millions, and other bestial crimes of the Third Reich for the first
time. The German media's exposure of the Eichmann trial led to
what appears to have been an emotional upheaval, vented through
demonstrations and protests throughout the country in favor of
relations with Israel. Prior to the trial, coverage of Nazi crimes had
been managed and soft-pedalled. But the trial was aired in its
entirety, unedited.
In November of that year, a German/Israeli association was
formed called "Die Briicke." Its aim was "to foster friendly relations
between the two countries by organizing meetings of Germans and
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Israelis of all professions and trades."^ Articles on the subject of
German/Israeli relations were filling the press. Most articles focused
on arms sales, cultural ties, arts, politics and student exchange
programs. In Israel, the press had now expanded their focus from the
Germans frank look at the Holocaust to their relations with the
Arabs. Ambiguity surfaced again. By January, 1962, Israel was calling
for cultural ties, however they were calling for "conditional" cultural
ties.
The ambiguity voiced by the Israelis was relayed to the
Germans through the press. And the German press responded in
kind. One after another, the German papers contradicted each other
in their reaction to the Knesset's "restricted" ties. Even papers of the
same party affiliation were taking opposing stands. While one
Christian Democratic daily, the Deutsche Zeitung, held that existing
cultural ties will be maintained even following the cabinet decision
approved by the Knesset, another paper, the Koelnische Rundschau
,
called the Israeli measures "foolish" and "a doubtful service to
German/Israeli relations."
Die Welt deplored the decisions as being a threat to the present
"shaky cultural relations" and as being contrary to Prime Minister
Ben Gurion’s views that the two peoples would get acquainted and
appreciate and understand one another. In paper after paper, the
Germans were discussing relations with Israel. The Eichmann trial,
coupled with the Knesset debate and the new rules governing
cultural relations between the Federal Republic of Germany and
Israel, were piped through the media and brought forth a wide range
of comment in the German press. The expanded coverage kept the
59
topic alive and deserves some of the credit for reviving the
discussion about Israeli/German relations within official circles.
Only a few years earlier, this debate had been abandoned in Germany.
The government, bound by the Hallstein Doctrine, maintained it
could not undertake steps in the direction of diplomatic relations
without risking Arab retaliation through the recognition of East
Germany. At least this is how the situation was recaptured by the
press.
Suddenly, in the early 1960s, the prominent commentators
began urging the Bonn government to abandon their excuses and
recognize the Jewish State. Writing in the Koelner Stadt-Anzeiger,
Dr. Joachim Besser, chief commentator of the German television
system during the Eichmann trial, said that the State of Israel
signified its willingness to establish diplomatic relations with
Germany no less than three different times. "But there was silence
in Bonn." At first, the German press had blamed Israel for its
"foolish" and "regrettable" act which threatened "to nip in the bud of
cultural relations that are shaky in any case." However, when the
exact tenor of the Knesset decisions became known, a calmer
approach made itself felt and a powerful, pro-Israeli trend in the
German press prevailed.
One of Germany's most influential dailies, the Frankfurt
Allgemeine, reported, "The Knesset decision has not closed the door
toward a better future, it remains open ... The Federal Government
should make earnest endeavors towards a reconciliation with Israel.
This may not be the central problem of German foreign policy, but it
certainly is a matter which the nation has at heart ... Whether the
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new Israeli rules will have a restrictive effect depends on the way
they are handled and this will be directly influenced by our (the
Germans') attitude.” The Frankfurt Allgemeine was not alone.
Close examination of the German papers of this period shows a
widespread interest in the Jewish State.
One after another, day after day, the German and Israeli papers
quoted each other. At times it seems that newspapers were quoted
more than diplomats. The German papers quoted mostly from the
Jerusalem Post. Toward the end of January 1962, papers in Germany
were paying great attention to the fact than an Israeli daily, "closely
linked with the foreign ministry," urged reconsiderations of the
Knesset decisions. It is important to note here that the countries
were using the media, as opposed to the diplomats, to relay messages
of public opinion and government policy.
The press of both countries continually quoted the other's
papers, praising and crediting the press for making or breaking
public opinion. In newspapers I reviewed, the articles and editorials
were constantly citing the influence of the media, a practice, no
doubt, aimed at lending credit to the media's power and
importance within nations. Whether true or false, the media
created an image of being indispensable.
Updates on Germany's stance toward relations with Israel
came to Israel through the press. Criticism of Germany from the
Israeli public and the Knesset came through the press to Germany.
The climate for the development of diplomatic relations was set up
not through traditional diplomatic channels, but rather by the media.
By the middle of 1962, Reuters had a report stating that Germany's
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Chancellor Konrad Adenauer declared that relations between the
two nations were improving. Soon afterward, the West Berlin
newspaper Telegraf reported that Dr. Nahum Goldmann, President
of the World Jewish Congress said he expects normal diplomatic
relations to be established "in the not too distant future."
Diplomatic Relations
It is often said that once people start talking about things, they
happen. Through the media, the people were talking. Others were
listening and reading about it. The parameters of the discussion had
been reduced by the media, as expected, to two sides: whether or not
diplomatic relations would be established soon or very soon.
It was in the early 1960s that the German politicians really
perfected the art of using television to raise public support. In
October 1964, during a televised broadcast in Bonn, Herbert Wehner,
deputy chairman of the SPD party, accused the CDU/CSU German
government of hypocrisy in its policy toward Israel and demanded
the establishment of diplomatic relations between the two
countries. 47 In the same program, Eugen Gerstenmaier (CDU),
president of the Bundestag, demanded the recognition of Israel by the
West German government. A few days later, foreign minister
Gerhard Schroeder, revealed in a report in the weekly Der Spiegel
that he did not approve at present of diplomatic relations with Israel
for fear of "revenge” by the Arab nations. (NOTE: Spiegel is the
German word for mirror -- as if to suggest the magazine is mirroring
reality.)
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As has come to be expected, the media showed the discussion
of German /Israeli relations in terms of two sides: those for and those
against. Surely there existed those in the middle and those
undecided and those apathetic. However, the media reports, by
revealing only those pro and those con, firmly set the parameters of
the discussion.
During this same period, the extent of weapon exchanges, a
secret agreement of direct military aid to Israel from Germany that
many had suspected for some time, was exposed by the media
,
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threatening the shape of foreign policy. Military assistance had been
kept secret as the Germans feared Arab reaction and Israel feared
opposition at home. But once out in the open, Arab states again
threatened to use their most powerful tool - the recognition of East
Germany. The West German government immediately reevaluated
its arms policy. By exposing the arms deals, the media had directly
influenced the fate of Germany's relations to the Middle East.
Tensions were rising.
It was also around this time that Egypt's President Nasser
wanted to develop a rocket for his battle against Israel and
commissioned German scientists to assist in the project. Israeli
intelligence, having learned of the operation, and that German
government funds were indirectly supporting the work, alerted their
government, which appealed to Bonn to intercede. The German
government cut their connection with the scientists but did not stop
them from continuing their work.
Israel called Germany "morally bankrupt" for not completely
halting the work of the scientists. Egypt, on the other hand, accused
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West Germany of setting fire to the Middle East. Meanwhile, West
Germany chose to continue sending arms to Israel, at least
temporarily. It wasn’t until Nasser began entertaining East German
Premier Walter Ulbricht in Cairo that the West German cabinet
halted arms to Israel.
By the end of 1964, the press reported an overwhelming
support for German /Israeli relations among the West Germans. At
the end of November, Reuters reported that German professors were
declaring themselves in favor of Israel and called for measures to
stop the work of German scientists in Egypt. The same day, a West
German youth organization was reported to have called on the
government to take up diplomatic relations with Israel as a
contribution to the reconciliation of Germans and Jews. On
December 2, former Defence Minister Franz Josef Strauss, now the
chairman of the CSU and the main initiator of special military
relations with Israel, was reported by Stern to have called for the
diplomatic recognition of Israel by West Germany. "The moral and
political restitution (of Germany) with respect to the Jews will be
achieved only when the German Federal Republic settles its
relationship to the State of Israel by means of diplomatic relations,"
Strauss told Stern.49 To have a strong personality such as Strauss
speak out in such a widely read and sensationalized magazine such
as Stern doubtless had a substantial impact on public opinion.
(NOTE: Stern is the German word for star -- as if to suggest the
magazine is somehow the guiding light.)
The press' coverage of German support for Israel continued.
On December 6, it was reported that West German churches in the
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All German Evangelical Church Council called for the
normalization of West German relations with Israel as well as
measures to stop German scientists working for Egypt. Press
conferences (an artificial or pseudo-news event created specifically
for the mass media,) were held where politicians answered questions
on the development of relations between the two countries.
Responding to questions at the mid-December conference.
Chancellor Ludwig Erhard (CDU) said that his government did not
intend to establish relations with Israel "at one leap,” Germany had
a "high responsibility, however."
The support for Israel gauged and reported by the media had
powerful effects on public opinion. By December 20, according to a
poll conducted in Tubingen and reported by Reuter, 50 percent of
West Germans favored the establishment of diplomatic relations
with Israel. Of the other 50 percent, only 10 percent were against
such relations, 15 percent were indifferent and 19 percent refused to
answer.50
On February 12, 1965, out of fear that Egypt was going to
recognize East Germany, Bonn gave official notice of the decision to
halt the weapon flow to Israel. This, together with the boycott of
German goods and descriptions of a "crisis" situation, were the focus
of Israel's media reports on Germany. The urgency of the reports
stressed a need for action. The tension was building. On February 28,
the media reported that several hundred German university
students in West Berlin demonstrated to rally support for an
immediate establishment of diplomatic relations with Israel.
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A little over a week later, the news arrived: On March 8, West
Germany's main newspapers splashed on their front pages news of
Chancellor Erhard's decision to set up diplomatic relations with
Israel. Bonn had decided not to sever relations with Egypt and rather
to react to Israeli disappointment by improving relations between the
two countries. Some gave more prominence to Bonn's offer to
Israel, but most devoted the headline to the decision not to sever
relations with Egypt.
In an editorial titled "The Middle East Knot is Loosened," the
pro-government Kolnische Rundschau said the Bonn government
had acted intelligently and decisively but that the problem was not
yet solved.
The independent General Anzeiger said one still had the dark
feeling that German difficulties in the Middle East were by no means
settled. "In any case it is intelligent that the break with Cairo is being
averted for the time being."
Said the Frankfurt Allgemeine: "The clarity now achieved is
that of a compromise. This should make it possible to minimize the
damage caused by the debacle ... but it will make no one totally
satisfied."
And Die Welt wrote: "A new epoch has begun in German
Middle East policy of a painful process. This applies initially and
above all to Israel."
These editorials or portions of them also appeared in the
Israeli press. One week later, the Knesset accepted Bonn's offer of
diplomatic ties in a vote of 66 to 29. Diplomats were exchanged
shortly thereafter. However, the diplomatic role of the media as
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messenger and mediator, which had begun shortly after the two
nations were established, would continue.
With the report of the establishment of diplomatic relations,
opinion polls showed that the Germans’ support for Israel had risen.
In May, the Institute for Applied Social Sciences in Bad Godesberg
reported that 57 percent of the German population favored the
move. Again ten percent expressed the view that the government
should have given in to Arab demands and not recognized Israel.
The survey showed no significant difference between the attitude of
supporters of the two major parties.
From the moment diplomatic relations were established,
articles and reports in the media take on an air of crisis. From the
beginning of the negotiations between Jerusalem and Bonn, in fact,
the majority of the press was prepared to deal with the issue with
more hysteria than reason. An example of this came with the
appointment of a German counselor to the new German embassy in
Israel. The uproar does not appear to have been caused by any
specific accusations or by any doubtful actions on his part, but rather
by the loose and sensationalist reports of an Israeli journalist in
Bonn who is said to have made a charge of guilt by association
without examining the facts in the case. As often occurred, the
German counselor was unjustly labeled a Nazi. True or not, the
accusations were enough to spark a massive scandal and probe into
the Nazi past of the newly appointed counselor. Dr. Alexander
Toeroek.
The incident spread through the German papers as well,
heightening the issue. The Israeli papers continued to investigate
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the allegations against Dr. Toeroek’s past. But the attack by the
media caused the German foreign ministry to issue a statement
repudiating the accusations. This was a perfect example of the media
having a direct impact on international relations, a chilling impact.
In November 1965, Toeroek felt compelled to return to Bonn
to "prove allegations against him were baseless." The affair was then
further heightened by an article published in a Hungarian
Communist journal and picked up by Israeli newspapers. The
publication of this article, which further accused Toeroek of wrong
doings, led to an official government probe into Toeroek’s past. It
also sparked several well-publicized student demonstrations at Tel
Aviv University against the presence of Toeroek in Israel. The
controversy abated pending the result of the investigation.
Through the exchanging of diplomats, Israel was hoping for
increased German support and Germany was hoping for increased
normalization of relations. Germany was disposing of "special
relations" and Israel was clasping to them. This in itself created for
special relations. At this time, Rolf Pauls was chosen as the first
German ambassador to Israel. He was sworn to treating relations
with Israel on the same level as any other nation. He never called
the relations special and was therefore greeted with great
opposition. After a year he became openly critical of Israel. In spite
of his stark approach, Pauls eventually gained recognition and
respect -- according to the German media. Former Prime Minister
Ben Gurion became one of his strongest allies in Israel.51
In February 1966, the German network ARD set up a
television bureau in Tel Aviv. This move had profound effects on
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the German peoples' image of Israel. Suddenly Germany had the
capability to capture the faces and families of Israel in addition to
stories on politics and commerce on a regular basis. The focus of the
reports could be seen as well as heard. The types of stories were
given a more human quality. The visits of heads of state began and
were now broadcast across the Mediterranean. During that year,
former Chancellor Adenauer and former Prime Minister Ben
Gurion met again, this time in Sde Boker. (They had first met in
1960 at the Waldorf-Astoria in New York.)
Reports on the visit between Adenauer and Ben Gurion were
not all positive. In May 1966, Die Welt reported that Israel’s reaction
to the visitor still showed signs of schizophrenia. "The
schizophrenia which became evident there was continued in the
officious and official statements by the representative of Israel."
In the months to follow, the Israeli papers focused on Israel’s
sale of explosives to Germany, the ban on Wagner-Strauss music in
Israel and the rise of the neo-Nazi party. While each item certainly
had to do with the events of the present, they were intertwined with
memories and events of the past. And while both countries were
reporting on similar topics in reference to their relations, the tone in
either country was quite different. Israelis were still able to criticize
Germany far more than Germany dared criticize Israel. As for the
Toeroek case, it seems the media let the case go and so did the
government.
In September 1966, the president of the World Zionist
Organization, Nahum Goldmann, who had been examining both the
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German and Israeli press of the time, made comments on the Israeli
press that appeared in the Jerusalem Post.
Criticism is more important to them (the media)
than praise. They would rather emphasize the
sensational than the positive. They like to point
out misdeeds and shortcomings. This has a
distinctive effect on those parts of the
populations who are not sophisticated enough to
evaluate properly what they are reading.5*
In May 1967, Egyptian forces reoccupied the garrison left by
U.N. forces at Sharm el-Sheikh, near the southern tip of the Sinai
and closed the Straits of Tiran to Israeli shipping, effectively
blockading the Israeli port of Eilat, situated at the head of the Gulf of
Aqaba. In retaliation, Israel attacked Egypt and other Arab countries
in June. This Six-Day-War, as it came to be known, left Israel in
possession of all Jerusalem, the West Bank area of Jordon, the Sinai
Peninsula in Egypt and the Gaza Strip and Golan Heights.
During this period, the flavor of Germany's reports on Israel
remain generally positive. In congruence with these reports,
Germany's public support for Israel reached an all-time high. The
Institut fur Demoskopie reported that in June 1967, 55 percent of
those asked which side they favor, the Israelis or the Arabs,
responded in favor of Israel. By the end of that summer, the
percentage had risen to 59 percent. Only two years earlier, before the
two countries had established diplomatic relations, a similar poll
revealed that only 24 percent of Germans sided with Israel should a
war break out between Israel and the Arabs.53 By the time of the Six-
Day-War, that had changed. The Germans had reached an
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unprecedented level of support for Israel. It was temporary and it
has yet to be repeated.
As the 1960s came to an end, so did the German media's
unquestioning support of Israeli policy. If one were looking for
clues or hints of the destiny of these two nations, they were plain to
see in the media reports of the late 1960s. Germany was letting go of
its past. Though the choice of the German ambassador to Israel was
marred by controversy, (due to his work as a career officer in World
War n,) he was not immediately replaced. The Germans did not feel
compelled to support or endorse Israel in the aftermath of the Six-
Day-War. And there was no question that Germany was attempting
to cater to the Arabs, particularly those ten Arab states that had cut
ties with West Germany in protest of German /Israeli relations. It
was a signal of the shift away from Israel and further into the Middle
East. The Germans were seeking a more balanced policy in the
Arab /Israeli conflict.
Not quite pro-Arab, the articles and documentaries of these
years come across clearly less pro-Israel. During the last years of the
1960s, Germany's need for Israeli support declined. But Israel's need
for German support grew. The media played a substantial role in
this transformation. Germany reduced its public expression of
support for Israel, a move that caught on and stuck. Israel, in the
meanwhile, extended its emphasis from the past to the prospects of a
cooperative future.
The first sign of the Germans' shift is found as early as June 26,
1967, when Der Spiegel published one of the first blatantly pro-Arab
articles in the popular German press. The article, "Unsere Araber"
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(Our Arabs), was written by Otto Koehler. And though it was unique
for 1967, within ten years, especially once the Ukud party had risen to
power in Israel in 1977, such articles critical of Israel become
commonplace in German media.54
The 1970s
One of the main differences between West Germany of the
1960s and West Germany of the 1970s was the country’s status in the
international arena. Within ten years, the Federal Republic moved
from somewhat of a political dwarf to a full member in the United
Nations. Prior to the 1970s, Germany maintained little or no
presence to speak of in the Middle East, especially as compared to the
superpowers. Great Britain or France. But the low profile
maintained throughout the first two decades of nationhood changed
by the 1970s. Within this brief decade. West Germany completely
revamped her policy toward Israel and her Arab neighbors. The
scope of these changes is measured by both the change in tone of the
media and the official policies of the government. Germany's
internal politics during the 1970s also experienced a major shift with
the formation of the SPD/FDP coalitions in 1969 under Willy
Brandt's chancellorship
In 1970, the official Germany policy toward Israel was summed
up in the following few sentencesrl) the Middle East problem and
world peace are interrelated; 2) West Germany wishes to reestablish
friendly relations with the Arab states; 3) West Germany respects its
tragic relationship with the Jewish people; 4) the resolution of the
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Arab /Israeli conflict must be based on Security Council resolution
242.K
But by the time the Munich Massacre, the Yom Kippur War,
two energy crises and the decade were over, it took the German
government a dozen pages to summarize its policy on the Middle
East. By 1981, the number of factors in Germany's Middle East policy,
though vague, had more than tripled. The following points were
dealt with in detail: 1) The Middle East in an overall peace policy; 2)
securing energy sources and export markets; 3) the special quality of
West German relations with Israel; 4) the interdependence between
the Soviet threat in the Middle East and the resolution of the
Arab /Israeli conflict; 5) the West German even-handedness and
neutrality in its Middle East policy; (6-11) some basic principles
relating to the resolution of the Arab /Israeli conflict; 12) the Euro-
Arab Dialogue; 13) Lebanon; 14) the necessity for a new Middle East
initiative.56
In 1968, Israel opened her first and only television station.
With the emergence of television, each country was creating new
images of the other and of themselves. Suddenly, the actions and
reactions of the government and military as well as the public at
large could be reviewed at the end of each day on the evening news.
An already tiny country, comparable to the size of New Jersey, Israel
became even "tinier." And, as in Germany, Israel suddenly had
access to parts of the world once unimaginable.
Television has had a strong effect on Israel and her own
internal politics. In contrast to wars of previous decades, the Yom
Kippur war, which broke out on October 6, 1973 coinciding with the
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holiest day of the Jewish year, would be the first one reenacted each
evening in every Israeli’s living room. In simultaneous attacks on
Israeli-held territory, Egyptian forces crossed the Suez Canal, while
Syrian troops launched an equally strong offensive on the Golan
Heights. Ending only after heavy losses of men and materials, cease-
fire agreements were made on October 24. But actually watching this
war develop each evening in black and white had an immense
emotional impact on the Israelis. "With the emergence of television,
the borders of the battlefield were broadened," said Yaakov Heichel, a
national security advisor to Israel's prime minister. "Now the war
can be brought straight from the battlefield to the home of the small
person or even the decision makers. It used to be that our national
strategies were assessed by a) the characteristics of the arena, b) what
we wanted to achieve and c) the method we would use. Now, in the
last decade, there is a new element: The media." As for Germany
and Israel, Heichel said, "Television took away all distances. Now,
on the southeast side of Germany, there is Israel. You can simply
climb over all the countries in between."57
Though it remained black and white for more than ten years,
the installation of television in Israel brought moving pictures of a
new Germany ~ a Germany that strongly contrasted with the movies
and memories they still held of the Third Reich. With the further
development of media relations, the Israeli public grew friendlier
towards Germany. Cultural and societal ties developed. In March
1972, 56.3 percent of Israelis polled favored continued ties with
Germany, while only 17.9 percent opposed.58 Television played a
major role in presenting a more human side of Germany; but, at the
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same time, it was television that brought to Israel the violent scenes
of the Olympic massacre of 1972 and clear pictures of Germany's new
relations with the Arab World.
The "Mediasized" Munich Massacre
On September 5, 1972 at 4 a.m., eight Fedayeen terrorists in
track suits, carrying large bags filled with arms, climbed over the
fence and into the athlete’s quarters of the Munich Olympics. They
moved directly to the Israeli dormitories, seized nine hostages and in
the process killed two other Israelis, a weightlifter and a wrestling
coach. By dawn the Munich Olympics had become a gigantic stage
for a terrorist spectacular. In total, 11 Israeli athletes were killed.
Practically every television organization in the world was present.
And the cameras were connected to most of the globe by satellite.
This real-life drama was enacted for untold millions of viewers.
In an effort to strain relations between Germany and Israel
while gaining recognition for themselves, the Palestinians had
emerged in the headlines and thus the international arena. Though
first introduced in the 1960s, it was not until Munich that the sound
of the Palestinian became unavoidable. At first the coverage of the
terrorists was negative throughout the German media and the
German authorities took various measures aimed at the prevention
of further terrorist activities in Germany. Two Arab extremists,
however, were still able to hijack a German airliner flying from
Damascus to Frankfurt. They then threatened to blow up the plane,
to secure the release of the three Arabs who had been detained after
the Munich Olympics massacre, with whom they flew on to Tripoli.
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In the eyes of the Israelis, the Germans showed little remorse for the
lack of security and for allowing the release of the terrorists without
ever totally condemning their actions. Israel's reaction turned to
outrage.
In either country, the press was used to defend the interests of
their own nation. In Germany the press was used to justify the
German security measures, both during the Olympics and in the
aftermath of the hijacking. In Israel, the press echoed the outcries of
the Israelis who protested the release of the Munich murderers. The
headlines of the Jerusalem Post best review the situation: "Bonn
Used Release to Advance Own Interests”
... "Brandt Reflects
Accusations By Israel" ... "Israeli Refuses to Step Foot on German
Soil" ... "Envoy Ben-Horin Called Home for Talks" ... "Cabinet Blasts
at Bonn for Freeing killer." The language is powerful and
sensational. The Israeli media firmly differentiated the good guys
from the bad guys.
Several months after the massacre, headlines and relations
began to improve: "Bonn's New Balance" ... "German Aviation
Labor Leader Will Help Fight Terrorism" ... "Israel and Bonn Seek
Constructive Course." Israeli attitudes towards Germany remained
positive. In November 1972, a poll conducted by the Public Opinion
Research of Israel (PORI) showed 34.6 percent of those polled
considered Germany a friend and only 9.4 percent saw Germany as a
foe. By the beginning of 1973, reports came out that the liberal parties
in the government coalitions of West Germany and Israel were
resolved to pursue closer cooperation and facilitate a dialogue
between the two countries and parties. Increased dialogue was
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joined by increased criticism of Israel in the German press. The
media seemed to have paved the way for a more accepting and
tolerant public opinion on issues that only a few years earlier would
have been considered far too contrary to Israel's interests and simply
unacceptable.
In June 1973, following the successful and highly publicized
visit to Israel of Willy Brandt, the first German head of government
to visit Israel while still in office, Israelis held a very positive image
of Germany. Of the Israelis polled that month by PORI, 66.6 percent
favored good relations with Germany, while 19.7 were against.
Things were different in Germany. Stern, Germany's largest picture
magazine, (circulation at that time was 1,300,000), unleashed a
violent anti-Israel campaign. The first of a series of articles said that
"terror and force were used by the Jews in the compulsory founding
of their state in 1948. They turned the Arab inhabitants of the
country into serfs and appointed themselves as their landlords. The
coveted land of peace was turned into a state of murderous
confrontation." For two decades, German journalists had held back
from any criticism of Israel. Those days were over.
"Explaining" the establishment of the Jewish state, the writer,
Kai Hermann, wrote that the fate of the illegal immigrants incited
world public opinion against the British. A full-page picture shows
the bloody bodies of the two British sergeants executed by Jewish
extremists in retaliation for the hanging of more than a dozen of
their own comrades. The caption read, "Fascism had many admirers
amongst the Jewish terrorists." Despite outrage in Israel and the
Israeli press, the next edition offered another unabashedly hostile
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reportage on Israel. The Stern articles were typical examples of an
overly simplified, sensationalized, "Us versus Them" approach.
While German public opinion generally remained favorable toward
Israel, channels for criticism had been opened and would remain so
for at least the next two decades.
The Energy Crisis
Following the extensive coverage of the Yom Kippur war,
German public opinion further rose in favor of Israel.59 But this was
the last hoorah. For against the backdrop of this war came the first of
two major energy crises which would introduce the western world to
the Arab world in an unprecedented manner. The outcome
doubtless had effects on German public opinion and Germany’s
policy toward the Middle East.
Until the 1970s, Germany's energy policy was organized
around the subsidization of coal. That changed in 1969 when the
country switched its focus to oil. Even though Germany was
financially better off than many other nations at this time, the
media’s use of the word energy "crisis” (1973-74) sent widespread
panic throughout the Federal Republic. The German government's
reaction was to drastically reduce energy consumption and institute
rationing, a move it later decided was more drastic than necessary.
Toward the end of the decade, the second energy "crisis" was
reported (1979-1980). The German economy was not as stable as it
had been in the early 1970s. The media suggests a stronger level of
panic. "The years to come are going to be critical," warned
Chancellor Helmut Schmidt (SPD) in June 1979. "Demand for oil is
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already growing beyond all measure, not only in the United States
and Western Europe
... The Soviet Union will badly need oil ...
World politics are certainly going to be very difficult during the
eighties."60
Perhaps the greatest impact of these energy "crises" was the
emergence of the Arab in German media. Once unaware or perhaps
choosing to ignore the Arabs, suddenly they were unavoidable in the
German media. The energy "crises", followed by noticeably
expanded diplomatic interest in the Arab World, lightened the
shadow that had been cast over the majority of the Middle East for
most Germans. With increased media coverage, the Arabs became
less and less foreign and relations, economic, cultural and political,
between Arabs and Germans improved.
By 1975, the Federal Republic reestablished diplomatic
relations with all the Middle East Arab states. Once established, the
media had better access to these regions and the Germans became
more tolerant, even interested in the perspectives of the Arab World.
Articles detailing Arab oil resources, Arab trade relations with
Germany, economic prospects in the Arab world and general cover
stories on the Arabic way of life surfaced in both television and print
media. The expanded media coverage greatly altered the Germans'
perspective of the Middle East and indeed the relations between
Germany and Israel for all time.
Still, as open as the Germans became toward the Arabs, there
was a limit to how friendly they could be -- at least publicly. The
Holocaust remained a scar that would not go away. Through the
power of the media, both German and Israeli, the Holocaust remains
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an obstacle that continues to hold major influence on any policy
Germany attempts to pursue in the Middle East. Any attempts by the
Germans to expand military assistance to the Arabs has met with
strong reminders of Germany's other life. Not a week passes that the
Holocaust isn't mentioned on German television. The constant
presence of the past not only flavors German policy in the Middle
East, it also serves as somewhat of an irritant to German/Israeii
relations.
How much of this can we take?" screamed one young
German student during a course on the Middle East conflict at the
University of Freiburg in the spring of 1985. "I was not alive during
the Holocaust. I am not guilty of anything. And I don't need to see
this every night on television. For me, Israel is a bad taste in my
mouth."
The sentiments expressed by that student in Freiburg are not
new. They have been brewing in young Germans for more than a
decade. Back in June 1973, the Israeli paper Haaretz began a series of
eight articles written by Shabtai Tevet dealing with the growing anti-
Israel sentiments among German youth. Ever since the Germans
began to let go of their past and allow for more and more open
criticism of Israel and Middle East policies, the voices of the German
New Left and other radical groups which were especially receptive to
the Palestinian point of view, got louder. The youth of the early
1970s and 1980s, bom after the ashes of World War II had been swept
away, were without any of the emotional constraints felt by their
parents; moreover, they had a media willing to voice their cries.
Public opinion polls taken during the first half of the 1970s indicate,
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however, that the extensive publicity these youth organizations
received in the early 1970s was not in proportion with public views.
At least at that time, sympathy for Israel still outweighed sympathy
for the Arabs in the 16-19 age group. More recent polls indicate that
is no longer the case.
Despite an end to Israel's preferential treatment in the
German press, relations between Germany and Israel in the Israeli
press following the Yom Kippur War were still noted as "special."
The German media, politicians and diplomats did not feel as called
upon to preserve the principle that the two nations maintain
relations of special moral quality. When Chancellor Schmidt
referred to the current situation in the Middle East, he spoke frankly
and mentioned the Holocaust publicly only under pressure or when
the subject was totally unavoidable. Schmidt articulated a clear shift
away from a solely pro-Israel stance. However, sympathy for the
Arabs did not eliminate the German's belief in Israel’s right to exist.
Thus, even as increasingly critical articles and documentaries
appeared in Germany, a thread of support for Israel was maintained
in the media.
The internal Israeli malaise of the mid-1970s, which included
the resignation of Prime Minister Itzhak Rabin after he lost the
support of the National Religious Party, fully reported in Germany,
also was partly to blame for the decline in Israeli prestige. And the
German media's coverage of left-wing attacks on Jewish real-estate
speculators in Frankfurt did not do the general Jewish image any
good. In 1976, after an extended period in which Israel’s reputation
in Germany suffered, there came a hint of enthusiasm and praise.
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The coverage of Israel’s successful raid on Entebbe, when Israeli
commandos attacked Uganda’s Entebbe airport and freed 103
hostages held by pro-Palestinian hijackers, left the German press
cheering. At least for the moment, criticism was swept aside,
demonstrating that the press can change its tune in an instant.
Around this time, German public opinion was as confused as
the obscure messages they were receiving through the media. Only a
decade earlier, the media would not have dared open the
microphone to the Arabs and enemies of Israel. Suddenly they were
more tolerant. But a barbaric act like the Entebbe hijacking was a
chance for the Germans to satisfy their basic political instinct, which
is to make themselves look good by again cheering the achievements
of the Jews. But even their praise was managed and reserved. The
press had to be very careful. Though praising the show at Entebbe
may warm the Germans' hearts, Arab oil warms their homes. By
now, their praise, like their criticism, was tempered.
It wasn't until the mid-1970s that the media of Germany and
Israel finally found a level of relations to report on free of ambiguity
and schizophrenia: sports. The soccer game is theoretically a
cement of friendship between the two nations. Sports coverage, free
of the stains of history, has, more than any other media coverage,
done much to develop more harmonious relations between
Germans and Israelis. And, while the coverage is a clear example of
the "Us versus Them" approach, at least both teams are playing on
the same field. The fact is, the average Israeli is more likely to know
the name of his favorite German soccer team than the name of the
German chancellor.
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By the end of the 1970s, the Germans had crossed all
boundaries once set up to avoid criticism of Israel. The feeling was
widely shared in Germany that Israel was no longer the underdog.
There was a drastic change in public opinion vis-a-vis Israel and her
neighbors. Criticism of Israel's policies in the occupied territories,
coupled with a second oil "crisis" led to growing German support for
improved relations with the Arab states. Germany's stronger hand
in the Middle East was joined by an end to its own silence on the
subject of the Holocaust. Some specifically credit the 1979 showing of
the film "Holocaust" on German television with the final break of
silence. Like the airing of the Eichmann trial, "Holocaust" was
viewed by 15 million Germans (an average 35 percent of all German
viewers during the four nights it was aired), igniting heated debates
and discussions.61 Reaction was immediate. 30,000 telephone calls to
television stations were logged and thousands of letters to editors
were written filled with confessions, remorse and astonishment.
Visits to concentration camps increased, as did requests for further
information on the period of the Holocaust. The airing has also been
credited with influencing the July 1979 repeal of the German Statute
of Limitation on murder, which had prevented any Nazi criminal
still undetected from prosecution. And, while the immediate
emotional effect of "Holocaust" faded, the repeal of the Statue of
Limitations was permanent.
The 1980s
Despite the complex web surrounding Germany's Middle East
policy, a web that necessarily entailed interests of oil, export.
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industry, history and national image, the media’s rendition of
German /Israeli relations was simplified. On the one side stood the
Israelis, on the other, the Arabs. The image was best portrayed in an
editorial cartoon published in the liberal Suddeutsche Zeitung on
June 16/17, 1980. The drawing is of a seesaw. On the one side sits
Israel's big-lipped, frowning Prime Minister Menachem Begin,
struggling to hold down his end. On the other is a gleaming
Palestinian leader Yasser Arafat. In the middle is a European, deftly
attempting to even out the scale.
The media of the early 1980's reveals that Germany had taken
a much stronger interest in the Middle East. German correspondents
were sent from one conflict to another - and the numbers of
conflicts steadily grew. The decade began with the outbreak of the
Iran/Iraq war, the ever-growing force of Muslim fundamentalism,
the continuation of the Lebanese civil war and eventually Israel's
invasion. Germany maintained a steady force of some 40
correspondents in Israel alone. But the increased level of
communication did not necessarily translate into better
communication. The messages were of war, action and politics —
and plenty of it. The amount of news from the Middle East
appearing in the German media had doubled, tripled and
quadrupled.
"Sometimes I feel what I'm doing here is ridiculous," said
Ulrich Sahm, a German correspondent in Israel. "I can use material
from the last page of an Israeli newspaper and they'll put it on the
front page in any German newspaper just because it's from Israel."62
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The Begin/Schmidt Affair
In 1980, the media in both countries had basically positive
reports on their relations, reporting that the two countries agreed "to
maintain closer and more frequent high-level contacts - especially
before taking new steps in Middle East policy."63 Shortly thereafter,
in April 1981, Chancellor Schmidt made a state visit to Saudi Arabia.
A speech made by Schmidt during his visit and widely broadcast
launched a level of verbal crossfire -- media warfare -- from Israel
that hadn’t been seen in nearly three decades. In his speech, Schmidt
said:
In the Palestinian conflict, one cannot attribute
all morality to the one side and shrug one's
shoulders in reference to the other side ...
Particularly this cannot be if one is a German,
living in a divided nation and raising the moral
claim of self-determination for the German
people. Then one must recognize also the moral
claim of the Palestinian people to self-
determination.64
While many Israelis objected to the apparent equation of
Palestinian and Israeli moral claims on Germany, it was Prime
Minister Begin who assailed Schmidt:
From a moral point of view, Schmidt’s
statements certainly rank as the most callous ever
heard. It seems that the Holocaust had
conveniently managed to slip his mind, and he
did not make mention of a million and a half
small children murdered, or of entire families
wiped out ... He doesn't care if Israel goes under.
He saw this almost happen to our people in
Europe not so long ago. He served in the armies
that encircled cities, until the work was finished
by the Einsatzgruppen.65
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Ulrich Sahm was the first German correspondent to obtain the
full text of Begin's assault. He immediately notified every German
news agency and radio station, informing them that he had the story
in its entirety. "You’ve heard all kinds of rumors," Sahm reported to
German radio. "But I have exactly what the story is right here." All
radio programming was stopped immediately and for the next three
minutes, Sahm quoted Begin word for word without commentary.
"I was the text," said Sahm proudly. "I blew the whole thing up and
made a big story out of it. I'm sure it had a great effect. When they
discussed the incident in the Bundestag the next day, it was my
report they were basing their information on. It had not yet made it
into the papers."66 At least for three minutes, Sahm had been the
diplomat, the transmitter of messages between one individual
political community and another."67
The battle between Begin and Schmidt did not stop there. For
the next week. Begin used the Israeli press, radio and rallies to
personally attack Schmidt. By now, the issue was publicized in the
media the world over and the entire Federal Republic went on the
defensive. Words uttered thousands of miles away in Israel got an
immediate emotional response from the German people. A
sufficient time period had passed since the Nazi era and, influenced
by the modern media, the Germans' reaction to Begin's comments
were swift, perhaps even extreme. After nearly 40 years, the
Germans were no longer willing to take full blame for the acts of
World War E.
One magazine after another during this time shows the
German citizens enraged by Begin's words. As so often is the case.
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the leader of a nation becomes the symbol of that nation. Begin was
now the media-created symbol of Israel. For Germany, it was not
only Begin, but all of Israel that had insulted them.
The reaction was blown up in the German media. On May 6,
the cover of Spiegel asked, "Sind Wir Alle Nazis?" (Are we all
Nazis?) And Spiegel was not alone. Stern reacted in an almost
identical manner. In fact, the German media in general was critical
of Begin and therefore the Israelis. The only paper to remain a
staunch Israeli supporter, as could be expected, was Die Welt. Other
major papers, like Die Zeit, remained critical but not foes of Israeli
policy. An examination of the fall in Germany's public opinion of
Israel suggests that the media's reporting on the Begin /Schmidt
affair had a direct effect on the way Germans viewed Israel.
According to the Allensbach polls, in 1978, 44 percent of the Germans
said they were on the side of the Israelis, as opposed to 7 percent on
the side of the Arabs and the rest undecided. By the end of 1981, only
21 percent were siding with the Israelis, while 24 percent were now
favoring the Arabs. For the first time in three decades, the polls
showed a stronger leaning toward the side of the Arabs.68
The Invasion of Lebanon
Israel's invasion of Lebanon in June 1982 was reported in
Germany, as elsewhere, as an aggressive and "flagrant violation of
international law and of the most basic humanitarian principles."69
The German media launched some all-out critical attacks on Israel.
On June 16 the cover of Stern asked, "Wissen die Israelis Noch Was
Sie Tun?" (Do the Israelis still know what they're doing?)
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Throughout the summer, Israel was portrayed as a military state that
had gone so completely overboard that they were capable of initiating
nuclear war at any moment.™ Spiegel went as far as calling for the
termination of further "special relations."?! Those involved in the
media insisted, it was not they who changed the image of Israel, it
was Israel who changed. It was not a reemergence of anti-Semitism
or prejudices they were reflecting, say the journalists, it was reality.
Dramatic coverage of the Israeli invasion, featuring crying
mothers, bombed out buildings and mangled bodies, had powerful
effects on German public opinion. By the end of the summer of 1982,
polls indicated a dramatic drop in sympathy toward Israel as
compared to the Arabs. Polls taken shortly after the Beirut massacres
indicated 20 percent of those Germans who responded favored Israel
and 26 percent favored the Arabs.™ Though public opinion is by no
means the decisive factor in developing foreign policy, in a
democratic nation foreign policy cannot continually run against
public opinion without eventually losing its support. At least from
the media, it appeared that Arafat had sent Begin flying off the
seesaw pictured in the aforementioned Suddeutsche cartoon.
In November 1982, in an interview with the Israeli daily
Davar, former Chancellor Willy Brandt warned, "I cannot deny that
in the existing circumstances there is a danger that reservations and
lack of understanding for Israel’s policy and behavior could
contribute to the reemergence of prejudices ... It is difficult to
understand certain positions taken by the Israeli government and its
arguments."
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Since 1982, the term "special relationship" has surfaced less
and less. Still, the notion of special relations can be heard in the
media reports. At least on the part of Israel, the past is not likely to
completely slip away from any discussions of German/Israeli
relations. This past has limited and shaped Germany's actions for
nearly four decades. However, as we move into another generation
of media professionals, one step further removed from the horrors
of the Holocaust, it is questionable whether the memories of the past
will be strong enough to shape German policy in the future.
Of those Germans polled in February 1983 by the Ins titut fur
Demoskopie, 52 percent sided with the statement that "Germany
should not place good relations with Israel above all else. The Arab
countries are important for our oil needs. Therefore, we should not
become enemies of these countries on Israel's account." Only 18
percent agreed with the opposing statement that "still today it is
important for the Federal Republic to attend to its especially friendly
relationship with Israel. We have brought on ourselves too much
guilt concerning the Jews."73
For years, Germany was little more than a painful memory for
many Israelis. But the effect of expanded coverage of the new
Germany and German society in Israel's media greatly opened the
Israelis to the Federal Republic. Social ties, realized through student
and cultural exchange programs, developed rather quickly. Once
unthinkable, German movies and music can now be seen and heard
in Israeli theaters. German cultural centers have opened, including
the Goethe Institut. As young people become more and more
interested in the past and present Germany, Israeli universities are
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expanding their programs in these areas. Israelis are now traveling
at record rates to Germany. It is not unusual to hear Hebrew spoken
in the streets of Munich. German imports fill Israeli clothing stores,
appliance stores and supermarkets. While this acceptance of
Germany is limited, and at times sensitivities from the past
resurface, clearly the once staunchly negative reaction to Germany
has faded.
The Hourglass of International Relations
Despite an appearance of near normalcy in relations between
Germany and Israel, the presence of the Holocaust remains. "We
don t forget the Holocaust," said Amnon Linn, a lawyer and member
of the Israeli parliament, during a private interview in the Knesset.
"The Holocaust is a source of strength and with this strength, Israel
can get money from Germany to be stronger. This is a great way to
avenge the Nazis and to strengthen the Jews. The media plays a big
part in keeping the Holocaust alive."74
Not everyone agrees. Yaakov Achemeir, Israel’s foremost
T.V. anchorperson and Knesset correspondent, claims, "The
historical impact of the Holocaust has a bigger impact than the
media. The media only reflect a sad reality. The Holocaust was the
most major event since the destruction of the Second Temple. The
Holocaust is within us — with or without the media. The
Armenians remember their Holocaust without the media and we
would remember ours. The media is a carrier of things that would
be within us even without the media ."75
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It is true. With or without the media, the events of the world,
celebrations, catastrophes, victories and defeats, have been and will
continue to take place. The media are not in control of these events,
but rather are in control of the hourglass of world events.
Depending on how the media choose to tip the glass, events can be
accelerated or even decelerated. Often, though admittedly not
always, the sands of the hourglass (international conflict, peace
treaties, diplomatic relations, etc.) will inevitably fall on their own.
The "when" and the "how" are now largely controlled by the media.
War and peace within nations have always been an intrinsic part of
the human condition. However, in the twentieth century suddenly
the media are largely responsible for the change in the nature, focus
and logistics of such events. The media are the great magnifying
glass.
In short, the event, such as the terrorist attack at the Olympics,
the exchange of diplomats, the murder of Klinghoffer or the unrest
in the West Bank will happen regardless, but its size and importance
in terms of the scheme of world events is now determined by the
media. Today, when someone throws stones on a side street in the
Middle East, you can be sure the whole world is watching. The
media are taking an event or an occurrence and giving it life, color,
drama and feeling like only the media can do. They are successful in
that they are usually able to match their messages to audience
interests. It is not the event that the media are creating (well, not
always), but rather it is the essence and the meaning of the event.
The media are monitoring, magnifying and accelerating interests and
processes.
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For nearly four decades, the media of Germany and Israel have
remained focused on each other. In Germany, they have focused on
the reparations, the Eichmann trial, the German scientists in Egypt,
the establishment of diplomatic relations, the reestablishment of
relations with the Arabs, the Statute of Limitations on Nazi
criminals and the selling of weaponry in the Middle East. In Israel,
the subjects shifted from negotiations to reparations, Nazi war
criminals, diplomatic relations, the Munich massacre and the
Germans’ openness toward the Arabs.
Despite the technological advances of the media in the last
four decades, communication between the countries does not seem
to have improved. Each country is communicating with itself and
not the other. Michael Marien, communications specialist and
editor of Future Survey maintains that communication itself is an
ideal and that non-communication, is widespread
.
76 It is not that
Israel and Germany are lacking in information to communicate to
one another. Rather, they fail to make constructive use of this
information in order to smooth relations. This, according to Marien,
is a central problem of modern communication. And it is not that
Israel and Germany are lacking in the proper technology to
communicate. But increasing the technology and flow even to global
proportions does not necessarily result in an increased level of
constructive communication. Improving the technological links
between nations has not shown to improve the communication and
relations between nations. Besides, journalists claim, and perhaps
rightfully so, that improving relations is not what they're paid to do.
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"It'S not my job to enhance relations" said German
correspondent Sahm. "I'm here in Israel reporting, representing my
readers ."77
It is not the role of the media to improve relations," said
Michael Karpin, editor in chief of the Israeli television news. "That
is not important for the media - not for the editors and not for the
correspondents. They are describing what’s happening in Germany
and Israel. That’s all ."78
Still others, perhaps the more idealistic, claim there is much
the media could do to improve relations. "We could try to cover
more about the new Germany and other aspects of the Germans
beside history," said Joe Bar El, manager of the Arabic television of
Israel. "We could switch and show good relations and how we're
trying to do things together ."79
Israeli Knesset member Amnon Linn feels the German media
could do a lot to improve relations. "They should show the
beautiful sides of Israel, the Kibbutz, the education, interviews with
the young. Their media shows only the negative. This plays a big
role in relations. Their media does not show the destruction of Israel
by the Arabs ."80
It is crucial to pay attention to these words of the journalists
and those who shape public opinion. For the nature and quality of
the communication between Israel and Germany could never be any
better than the journalists who produced it. These journalists are
crucial figures in transforming social order, for, as Altschull writes,
"it is they who paint the pictures of the world on which decisive
human actions are based ."81
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In hiring these journalists, the media organizations of
Germany and Israel most certainly play a substantial role in setting
the standards of what will and will not be reflected in the media of
either nation. "Through its choice of 'experts,' the media establishes
what range of views is acceptable.'® Admittedly, these "experts" are
rarely told what to write about a specific subject, however most are
told daily on what subject to write.
In short, the perspectives of Israel and Germany that emerge
through the news are, in the final analysis, selected and
reconstructed by a small group of journalists within each country.
That is why it is commonly assumed that any particular slant that
news appears to have can be explained by examining the personal
values of the newsmen involved in the selection process, which is
precisely what I have attempted to do over the last few years in my
interviews in West Germany and Israel. Interestingly enough, the
journalists with whom I spoke maintained that they do report
events from a neutral and objective standpoint. It appears that this
goal of objectivity has been so widely disseminated and accepted that
the journalists have come to believe that they are able to enter the
super human sphere of truth .
Conclusion
After reviewing hundreds of articles, documentaries and news
reports on German/Israeli relations, it appears that on the
international level, due to physical, economic and human
constraints, the technology of the media are reinforcing already
existing patterns of thought, perhaps even cultural bias. As an
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industry that must sell itself, the media are apt to ignore their innate
subjectivity and make claims like Time magazine's or CBS' slogans,
"Time will take you there" or "CBS brings you the world." And
while Time and other mass media may have the potential to "take
us there," they are more likely to leave us at home. The
complexities of modem society, as portrayed in thirty-second news
spots, are more apt to breed increased non-communication than
clear communication. Factors such as organizational and economic
constraints, human and cultural bias, advertising interests, language
barriers, and national self-interests prevent clear access to the
happenings within the other country. Thus, despite the potential of
the tools the media have created, history, culture and other
limitations prevent the two countries from realizing their potential
and keep them in a constant state of flawed communication — at
times rigidly divided.
The expanded power of the media has expanded the media's
potential to foment the discord and disharmony that divide and
separate nations. Rather than turning the world into a global
village, the expanded technology might well create, infuse, magnify
and reinforce global divisions. On the other hand, it is quite
possible that as we extend the wires and waves of communication,
we continue to extend and perhaps broaden the divisions between
peoples and cultures. This thesis, based on one case study, was by no
means a condemnation of the media's new-found strength, but
rather an attempt at a critical analysis of the mass communications
process in the twentieth century and the potential effects on
international relations.
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It is difficult to pinpoint the exact effects of the media on
international affairs, or specifically in the relations between
Germany and Israel. The relations between the electronic media and
politics are still too young for us to have a complete understanding
of the ramifications of this linkage. However, upon closer
examination, certain characteristics and aspects of the outcome of
this connection become apparent. Indeed, in a world of six billion
people, we surely would know little of the billions beyond our
shores were it not for the media. It is the media alone that tell us
about the distant lands and governments that we would otherwise
not bring to mind. It was with this in mind that Bernard C. Cohen,
some 30 years ago, came up with the still applicable statement that
"while the press might not tell us what to think, it does tell us what
to think about 83 ... or not to think about. The media are shaping all
of our images of the world and actually dictating to us which
subjects we should have opinions on.
With their awesome power to control what we think about,
the mass media of our age could be leading us toward a global
society without boundaries or deeper into a world of divided
xenophobic nations. Like the mushroom cloud that carries the
seeds of both knowledge and death, the mass media of our time can
lead us towards war or towards peace. "The press can render it
easier for humankind to destroy itself ... Or it can assist in the
creation of a global harmony."84
The misperceptions or deceptions of the newsmakers lead to
the audiences' misunderstandings of the distant lands and distant
peoples. Unlike local or national reporting, international reporting
\
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has the added burden of making the completely unknown and
unseen familiar in a few minutes or a few seconds. More often than
not, the news relays not the event, crisis or catastrophe itself
unfolding before a live camera, but rather a created version or story
about the event recreated on tape or in news print from selected
portions of the actual event or perhaps from other second-hand
stones as reenacted by another news medium. In the world of
international relations, it is this imperfect media that set the
parameter or agenda of the international debates and provide us
with a lexicon for international confrontation. The way we perceive
the other nation and the vocabulary we use in our descriptions
depends on the reports of the media. Sadly, the same objective
reporting that is a virtue and an aim when reporting on one's own
country does not seem to be as crucial when reporting on a foreign
country. But why should the audience accept such biased and often
inaccurate international reports?
It seems that in the constant search for identity, security and
recognition, a nation feels more secure when other nations are
described as the irrational aggressor. By putting down other nations,
a people can feel uplifted and gain a certain sense of national self-
righteousness. Perhaps it is also an offshoot of the audiences'
pursuit of organization that allows them to so easily accept the
division between themselves and the "other" rather than a merger
with those "others." Distant lands are viewed not in order to
transcend borders, but to establish them. In world news, "we" or
those who live within reach of the media and the prevailing
ideology are carefully categorized as the "Good Guys" and "they," or
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those outside of the frontiers who engage in different and therefore
deviant behavior are the "Bad Guys." In an attempt to compress
reality into clearly defined molds, the media are quick to label and
categorize. It is as a result of such oversimplification and labeling by
the media that misunderstandings between nations are created and
persist.
Bringing two nations together rather than further dividing
them requires a more in depth understanding of how people think
and behave beyond our shores. It may also require stepping outside
of the organizational constraints of a medium and really trying to
grasp what the "other" is all about rather than just reporting what
the organization or audience wants the "other" to be about. The
journalist must be willing to go beyond the easily accessible,
economically feasible, accepted and comfortable ideological system
from which he stems in order to shrink the divides that exist
between nations and thereby inform, educate and assist in the
resolution of international conflict. As J. Herbert Altschull
concludes, "Access to the news media must be given to the Bad Guys
as well as the Good Guys if there is going to be a genuine
understanding. The code of objectivity may not be discarded at the
water's edge."85
The dangers of developing divisions and creating a foe out of
the "other" nation or people is not a new phenomena. The
difference between the present and the past is the ability of the mass
media to label and amplify those differences. Sigmund Freud
warned of the dangers of such labeling back in 1915 in his brave
essay entitled "Thoughts for the Times on War and Death." In his
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writings, Freud noted the ease with which Europe had descended
into a nightmare of dangerous and dividing nationalism
- just at a
point when he and many others believed a more inclusive
European culture was emerging:
The great nations themselves, it might have been
supposed, would have acquired so much
comprehension of what they had in common,
and so much tolerance for their differences, that
'foreigner' and 'enemy' could no longer be
merged, as they still were in classical antiquity,
into a single concept .86
Freud blamed the "experts" of his epoch, the anthropologists and
psychiatrists, who, much like our media "experts" of today, were
endowed by the people with tremendous respect. For these "experts"
then, like our "experts" today, raced to declare the enemy or
foreigner a "degenerate," an "inferior" race with a "disease of mind
and spirit. Rather than challenging these xenophobic divisions, the
"experts" of Freud’s day, just as the "experts" of the mass media,
perpetuate and deepen them. The difference is the mass media today
have a more powerful technology with which to amplify their
language of conflict.
In studying the media of a nation, what stands out is the
media's tendency to minimize any existing similarities between
nations and greatly exaggerate the differences. Moreover, peace will
always take a back seat to war. News is conflict, especially
international conflict. International harmony and good relations
between nations are more stabilizing and surely more conducive to
global survival but it is not news. That is why the journalist has
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difficulty creating pressing issues that are considered media worthy
out of unpressurized situations. The journalist, therefore, finds it
difficult to point out where Us and Them agree and share the same
goals and values.
More research is needed on the future of international
communication and the potential role of the mass media. For as
inventors continue to perfect the technology of communication, the
power of the media to unify or divide the world increases. More
than technology, we must continue to perfect our ability to
communicate. For the future system of communication between
nations will play a greater role in the economic, political and cultural
exchanges. The difference between the twentieth and the twenty-first
century is the more global nature of these exchanges. In this respect,
communication is perhaps as important as defense is as a means for
achieving and maintaining global peace .87
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